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NORMS GOVERNING THE INTERSTATE USE OF FORCE:
EXPLAINING THE STATUS QUO BIAS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW
Richard Hanania∗
ABSTRACT
In this Article, the author argues against the standard view that there is no
coherent and effective doctrine of international law regarding the interstate
use of force. It is generally held that states interact with one another in a state
of anarchy, at least when it comes to national security. After defining
international law, I show that this is not completely accurate. Reflecting a
status quo bias, classic invasions and territorial aggrandizement through force
are illegal. Since 1945, states that have undertaken classic invasions have
generally been sanctioned, and no state has taken territory from another by
force since 1976. Part II presents a model that explains how norms not
enforced by a centralized authority can have an impact on state behavior. I
rely on political psychology and behavioral economics literature to show that
the normative influence of law can cause states to refrain from attacking one
another and the global community to sanction aggressors. The model as an
explanatory tool is made even more plausible by investigations into earlier
examples of the power of ideas to change state behavior and the finding that
materialist or economic explanations of the status quo bias of international
law are at best incomplete.

∗ Richard Hanania is a political science Ph.D. candidate at the University of California, Los Angeles. He
received his J.D. from the University of Chicago Law School in 2013.
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INTRODUCTION
Even among those who specialize in the subject, international law is a
much-derided field. Contemporary textbooks on international law, unlike those
covering other subjects, regularly begin with the question of whether it actually
exists.1 This is not a new development. The first paragraph of Hans Kelsen’s
Principles of International Law asks whether “so-called international law . . .
[is] law in the same sense as national or municipal law?”2 To take a more
recent example, two scholars begin their recent book with the observation that
“[i]nternational law has long been burdened with the charge that it is not really
law.”3 The main criticism is simple enough. Within a single country, the state
enforces the law, but there is no third-party to ensure compliance with
international law, often rendering it ineffective.4 Therefore, according to this
line of analysis, states are best understood as units that are simply concerned
with advancing their own interests, not legality.
This criticism has been particularly salient when discussing the use of
force. Maintaining peace between states has long been considered the central
function of international law.5 Here, scholars conclude that the rules purporting
to regulate interstate interactions, in particular Article 2(4) of the U.N.
Charter,6 have been particularly ineffective.7 This appears to be a logical
1 See, e.g., BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (3d ed. 1999); ALINA
KACZOROWSKA, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (4th ed. 2010) (noting that “[t]he status of international law as
‘law’ has been challenged at both the theoretical level . . . and at the practical level”); MALCOLM N. SHAW,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (5th ed. 2003); GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (7th ed. 1996) (“International law is to law as professional wrestling is to
wrestling.” (quoting Stephen Budiansky, A New World’s Signs of Confusion, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept.
20, 1993, at 8.)).
2 HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (Robert W. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1966).
3 JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (2005).
4 SHAW, supra note 1, at 2–3. International law supposedly lacks the “identifying marks” of domestic
law, such as “the existence of a recognised body to legislate or create laws, a hierarchy of courts with
compulsory jurisdiction to settle disputes over such laws and an accepted system of enforcing those laws.” Id.
5 Ian Hurd, Is Humanitarian Intervention Legal? The Rule of Law in an Incoherent World, 25 ETHICS &
INT’L AFF. 293, 295 (2011) (“International law is centrally concerned with regulating war between
states . . . .”); see, e.g., ANTHONY AUST, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (2d ed. 2005); MICHAEL J.
GLENNON, LIMITS OF LAW, PREROGATIVES OF POWER: INTERVENTIONISM AFTER KOSOVO 2 (2001).
6 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”),
7 Thomas M. Franck, What Happens Now? The United Nations After Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 607, 607
(2003) (citing Thomas M. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)? Or: Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force
by States, 64 AM. J. INT’L L. 809, 836 (1970)).
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extension of the idea that the lack of an enforcement mechanism is what makes
international law meaningless. If decisions relating to the economy or the
domestic justice system are too important to be controlled by unenforceable
mandates from abroad, states certainly cannot be expected to act in
conformance with international law in the area of national security. Despite the
fact that the U.N. Charter prohibits one state from using force against another,
except in self-defense or with Security Council approval,8 there have been at
least “690 overt foreign military interventions between 1945 and 1996.”9 Some
blame the supposed failures of international law to stop war for tarnishing the
reputation of the entire field.10 Others maintain that, to the extent that it does
restrain state behavior in the area of national security, the effects of
international law have been pernicious.11
This Article challenges these pessimistic conclusions. Part I shows that,
despite claims that international law is ineffective, the concept is not
meaningless with regards to the interstate use of force. Whether we look at the
text of the U.N. Charter or actual state practice, some forms of state
aggression, particularly seizing territory by force, are universally considered
unacceptable.12 Violators of these norms face overwhelming sanctions from
the world community. An analysis that uses both the text of the U.N. Charter
and the “obey-or-be sanctioned” standard can help us find answers regarding
the question of when the use of force by one state against another is illegal.
Some illegal wars are outlawed both from the perspective of the U.N. Charter
and customary international law. Even under the most stringent “state practice”
standard, for example, one state seizing land from another is unquestionably
prohibited.13 At the same time, certain uses of force that appear to be banned
by the U.N. Charter have become accepted by the international community;
this behavior may draw rhetorical condemnation but no meaningful sanctions.

8

U.N. Charter arts 50–51.
GLENNON, supra note 5, at 69.
10 CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 1, at 31 (“Some of the traditional skepticism about international law
may be attributable to the extensive attention given to the highly indeterminate and often unobserved norms
against the use of force . . . .”).
11 See John Yoo, Using Force, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 729, 782–84 (2004).
12 Cf. id. at 780 (“[N]ations may use force to resist aggression that . . . seizes territory.”).
13 Id. State practice has been defined as “behaviors respecting a particular issue that amounts to direct
action by, or has a direct effect on, the state whose behavior is in question.” A. Mark Weisburd, The
International Court of Justice and the Concept of State Practice, 31 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 295, 303 (2009).
9
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Humanitarian intervention and limited strikes retaliating against terrorism
appear to fall into this category.
The fact that the world community punishes classic invasions goes a long
way towards explaining why states do not initiate this type of war.14 At one
level, this solves what has been called the compliance question, which asks
why states would obey international law when it lacks an enforcement
mechanism.15 On the other hand, this obscures the root of the problem, because
it does not explain why third-parties to conflicts sanction aggressors. In the
realist model, there is still a collective action problem: While it would be in the
best interest of all members of the international community to enforce rules
against aggression, every particular state is better off shirking its duty and
hoping that others deal with the problem.16 To prevent this type of free riding
in domestic law, the state exists to ensure that, for example, everyone pays
their taxes or serves in wartime.17 The problem in interstate relations is the fact
that there is no such “international leviathan.” If states do consistently sanction
certain forms of aggression, as Part I shows, it only begs the question of what
leads them do so. Part I closes by replying to those who argue that the decline
of classic wars can be explained without invoking international law or global
norms.18
The compliance problem is dealt with in Part II, which shows that most
states do not invade one another because their leaders and populations have
internalized the proposition that classical invasions are immoral. The rule
against classic invasions is so embedded and unquestioned that those who
violate this norm shock the conscience of the international community and
become pariahs, as is what happened after Saddam Hussein’s 1990 invasion of
Kuwait.19 Political scientists have shown that international law is most likely to

14

See infra Part I.B.
See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2627–28
(1997) (reviewing ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE
WITH INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS (1995), and THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
INSTITUTIONS (1995)).
16 See MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS IN LAW
14 (2009).
17 Id.
18 See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 11, at 749 (“[L]eading political scientists and diplomatic historians attribute
the reduced number of interstate wars and the stability of the international system generally during the Cold
War period to the bipolar balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union.”).
19 See Franck, supra note 7, at 612.
15
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affect interstate relations when it can create objective Schelling Points that can
shape expectations.20 Building on the work of previous scholars, Part II
presents a model that explains when an international norm is likely to be
successful. As the rules composing the status quo bias are just the kind of
norms that are likely to be respected, it is unsurprising that they have been
followed. As will be shown, an embedded international norm virtually
eliminating a certain practice is not new; the decline of slavery and colonialism
are equivalent recent historical examples of the power of ideas, even without a
third-party enforcer, to shape state conduct on the international plane. These
norms share important similarities with the laws against classic invasions and
seizing foreign territory: They are specific, inherently morally compelling, and
at one point were backed by powerful norm entrepreneurs. Once one of these
practices is considered immoral, logic dictates that the others also be
forbidden.21 This Article ends with some thoughts on why understanding the
current state of international law regarding the use of force is important and
suggests that, before arguing for reform, future research and activism should
take into account the fact that the current system has succeeded in maintaining
a remarkable degree of stability.
A. Methods of Analysis
Many international law scholars who have incorporated lessons from
international relations into their work have adopted the paradigm of realism,
particularly in the area of the interstate use of force.22 Similar to the way
classical economics derives insights from the aggregation of individual
behavior, realism sees states as self-interested units seeking to maximize their
own interests.23 At the extreme, states are like “billiard balls” with similar
internal properties and structures; they all want the related aims of wealth and

20

See Paul K. Huth et al., Does International Law Promote the Peaceful Settlement of International
Disputes? Evidence from the Study of International Conflicts Since 1945, 105 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 415 (2011).
Schelling Points “refer to coordination brought about (at least partly) by exploiting the salience of decision
labels.” Vincent P. Crawford et. al., The Power of Focal Points Is Limited: Even Minute Payoff Asymmetry
May Yield Large Coordination Failures, 2008 AM. ECON. REV. 1443, 1443.
21 See infra text accompanying notes 309‒13.
22 Stephen M. Walt, International Relations: One World, Many Theories, 110 FOREIGN POL’Y, Spring
1998, at 29 (Special Edition).
23 See id. at 29, 31.
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security, and how they behave towards one another is based on relative
power.24
The influence of realism on international law is not surprising. It has been
the most dominant school of thought in international relations since the end of
World War II.25 Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, one analysis
shows that realism may have been eclipsed by more liberal schools of
thought.26 Regardless, realism continues to be extremely influential, and has
recently been used in international law scholarship.27 Realism stands in
contrast to “constructivism,” which rather than taking state interests as given,
analyzes international relations by taking account of how interests and
identities are construed in a way that is endogenous to the process of
interaction between countries.28
Realism and constructivism begin to blur together when we remember that
many realists take “ideational” preferences into consideration. Kathryn Sikkink
shows that the foreign policies of many Western states began putting an
emphasis on human rights after the end of the Second World War.29 She writes
that “[t]he emergence of human rights policy is not a simple victory of ideas
over interests. Rather, it demonstrates the power of ideas to reshape
understandings of national interest.”30 Both of these sentences appear to
describe very similar processes, and neither construction is obviously superior
to the other.

24 Margarita H. Petrova, The End of the Cold War: A Battle or Bridging Ground Between Rationalist and
Ideational Approaches in International Relations?, 9 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 115, 117 (2003) (citing JOHN J.
MEARSHEIMER, THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS (2001)) (reviewing JEFFREY CHECKEL, IDEAS AND
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL CHANGE: SOVIET/RUSSIAN BEHAVIOR AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR (1997),
and ROBERT ENGLISH, RUSSIA AND THE IDEA OF THE WEST: GORBACHEV, INTELLECTUALS, AND THE END OF
THE COLD WAR (2000), and JACQUES LÉVESQUE, THE ENIGMA OF 1989: THE USSR AND THE LIBERATION OF
EASTERN EUROPE (1997)).
25 See Thomas C. Walker & Jeffrey S. Morton, Re-Assessing the “Power of Power Politics” Thesis: Is
Realism Still Dominant?, 7 INT’L STUD. REV. 341, 342 (2005) (citing JOHN VASQUEZ, THE POWER OF POWER
POLITICS: A CRITIQUE (2d ed. 1983)).
26 See id. at 350–53.
27 See, e.g., GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 3; Stephen D. Krasner, Realist Views of International
Law, 96 AM. SOC. INT’L L. PROC. 265 (2002); Yoo, supra note 11.
28 See Alexander Wendt, Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,
46 INT’L ORG. 391, 393–94 (1992).
29 Kathryn Sikkink, The Power of Principled Ideas, in IDEAS AND FOREIGN POLICY: BELIEFS,
INSTITUTIONS, AND POLITICAL CHANGE 140 (Judith Goldstein & Robert O. Keohane eds., 1993).
30 Id.
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In another example demonstrating the point that even realists take ideas
seriously, Goldsmith and Posner acknowledge that some states may care about
ideological preferences and human rights.31 On the other hand, they write that
their analysis “consistently exclude[s] one preference from the state’s interest
calculation: a preference for complying with international law.”32 This is
because they do not believe that states care about international law as much as
they do about economic or security interests.33
This Article does not contend that states care more about following
international law per se than they do about other interests that might weigh
against compliance. Rather, it argues that world leaders have a significant
desire to comply with the most important rule of international law: the ban on
classic invasions. Or, compliance is now in the “national interest” of most
states. The language adopted is not important; what matters is the explanatory
power of the theory presented as to why states follow international rules
regarding the interstate use of force, even when doing so does not bring greater
security or economic growth.
This Article breaks with realism by putting less emphasis on the concern
with traditional areas of national interest like economic growth and security. If
citizens only cared about that, few international collective action problems
would be overcome. Also, realism underestimates the extent to which leaders
adopt a “logic of appropriateness” in making international relations decisions
and the potential for certain rules to be morally compelling across practically
all of the world’s cultures. At the same time, the Article disagrees with the
more extreme claims of constructivists who imply that human nature, and thus
the concept of what counts as a state interest, is nearly infinitely malleable.34
The approach is agnostic towards the efficacy of international law in general,
but more optimistic about its influences when certain conditions are met. In the
future, rather than focusing on the compliance problem as a general matter,
legal scholars would be better served by differentiating between separate rules

31 Cf. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 3, at 6 (distinguishing themselves from realists “who assume
that a state’s interests are limited to security and (perhaps) wealth”).
32 Id. at 9.
33 Id. at 10 (“It is unenlightening to explain international law compliance in terms of a preference for
complying with international law.”)
34 See J. Samuel Barkin, Realist Constructivism, 5 INT’L STUD. REV. 325, 330 (2003) (“There exist
theories of human nature that are incompatible with political realism, including those that argue that human
nature is infinitely malleable or ultimately perfectible.”).
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of international law and asking how effectively certain global norms apply
towards different subject matters.
I. THE STATUS QUO BIAS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Just as it is often said that international law does not exist as a general
matter, scholars argue that there is no coherent doctrine governing the
interstate use of force in particular.35 After NATO’s bombing of Kosovo in
1999, many of those who believed that the war violated the U.N. Charter
declared the document a dead letter.36 In 1970, Thomas Franck argued that the
attempts made by the United Nations to regulate the interstate use of force had
failed, as states were still fighting wars without facing sanctions.37 He revisited
that same theme thirty-three years later, seeing the 2003 invasion of Iraq as
confirming his earlier view.38 Glennon writes that between 1945 and 1980,
there were one hundred armed conflicts that killed over 25 million people, in
addition to thirty major continuing wars as of 1998.39 Like Franck, Glennon
presents this as proof that the United Nations and the international community
in general have been unsuccessful in their collective efforts to prevent war.40
Other scholars argue that even if international law exists in some abstract
sense, international legal norms do not actually influence state behavior.41
When describing the role of law in affecting state decisions regarding the use
of force, any dissimilarities between those who deny the existence of relevant
rules and those who believe that those rules are meaningless are more apparent
than real. It is not easy to find scholars who defend the current state of affairs,
or even argue that there is some coherence underlying the way that the
international community reacts to interstate aggression.
This Part contends that these conclusions judge international law by
unrealistic standards and rely on certain conceptual mistakes. A less ambitious
conception of what international law can accomplish can provide an

35

See Franck, supra note 7, at 607–08.
See GLENNON, supra note 5, at 62.
37 See Thomas M. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)? Or: Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force by
States, 64 AM. J. INT’L L. 809, 809–10, 835–36 (1970).
38 Franck, supra note 7, at 607–08.
39 GLENNON, supra note 5, at 67–69.
40 Id. at 1–2.
41 See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 3, at 3 (submitting that international law does not influence
state behavior, but that state behavior influences international law).
36
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appreciation for our current period of remarkable peace and more realistic
expectations regarding potential international law reforms. While this Article
argues that a well-functioning and logically consistent doctrine of international
law regarding the use of force exists, this does not necessarily mean that the
world has eliminated all armed conflict. Rather, international law has
succeeded in placing limits on the kinds of conflicts that have been the most
destructive. This Part begins with a discussion of the general concept of
international law and its origins.42 In determining the state of the law regarding
the interstate use of force, there are two main tools of analysis: the U.N.
Charter and the obey-or-be-sanctioned standard.43 From there, this Article
shows that certain kinds of interstate force can coherently be called illegal,
while others are legal, and yet others fall somewhere in a kind of grey area.44
Finally, this Part briefly discusses some alternative theories that seek to explain
the decline of the classic invasion and describes their shortcomings.45
A. What Is International Law?
Traditionally, there have been two sources of international law.46 The first
is treaties, which are written agreements signed by the relevant officials of two
or more states.47 Emer de Vattel wrote that rulers of states are independent,
sovereign, and equal.48 Through treaties, countries could bind their own future
behavior.49 Because of this, the rules governing interstate interactions have
been said to be consent based.50 The second source of international law is
custom. A practice is part of customary international law when a large portion
of states usually engage, or refrain from engaging, in the relevant act, and do
so at least partly out of a sense of moral obligation.51 The latter requirement is

42

See infra Part I.A.
Id.
44 See infra Part I.B.
45 See infra Part I.G.
46 See Krasner, supra note 27, at 265.
47 See e.g., DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 26 (3d ed. 2010).
48 EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE, APPLIED TO THE
CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS WITH THREE EARLY ESSAYS ON THE ORIGIN AND
NATURE OF NATURAL LAW AND ON LUXURY 68 (Béla Kapossy & Richard Whatmore eds., 2008) (1773).
49 Id. at 77.
50 See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 3, at 26.
51 Id. at 23; SHAW, supra note 1, at 70–71; J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International
Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 449, 451–52 (2000).
43
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referred to as opinio juris.52 This appears to be sensible, as without a thirdparty enforcer of international law, early modern theorists could only put their
faith in the consciences of sovereigns.
Because the U.N. Charter has virtually unanimous consent,53 it is where
any discussion about the legality of state use of force must begin. The
normative and legitimizing value of the document goes beyond that of a
normal treaty; to many, it has the characteristics of an “international
constitution.”54 Scholars constantly debate whether instances of interstate uses
of force are consistent with the U.N. Charter, while assuming that it has
superseded any legal rules that preceded it.55 Diplomats and politicians also
regularly cite the document to support their positions.56 Reflecting the concerns
of the United Nation’s founding generation, Article 1 lists the purposes of the
organization, with the first being “[t]o maintain international peace and
security.”57 The Charter echoes Vattel and other founders of international law
in granting all member states sovereign equality.58 Article 2(4) contains what is
likely the most important sentence in the history of international law: “All
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or
in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”59
This seemingly unequivocal rule against the use of force is softened by
Article 51, which states: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken

52 Opinio juris “is the central concept of customary international law . . . [and] refers to the reason a state
acts in accordance with behavioral regularity.” Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 3, at 23.
53 See 1 UNITED NATIONS, MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL:
STATUS AS AT 1 APRIL 2009, at 5–10, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/26, U.N. Sales No. E.09.V.3 (2009), for a list
of signatories to the United Nations Charter.
54 Russell S. Sobel, The League of Nations Covenant and the United Nations Charter: An Analysis of
Fassbender,
The
Two International Constitutions, 5 CONST. POL. ECON. 173, 173 (1994); see also Bardo
United Nations Charter as Constitution of the International Community, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 529,
566–68 (1998) (“The United Nations is the primary institutional representative of the international
community.”).
55 See generally Franck, supra note 35, at 836; Yoo, supra note 11.
56 Yoo, supra note 11, at 769, 771.
57 U.N. Charter art. 4, para. 1.
58 Id. art. 2, para. 1.
59 Id. art. 2, para. 4.
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the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”60 The
Security Council is given the exclusive right to “determine the existence of any
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” and decide on an
appropriate response.61 If necessary to enforce its recommendations, the
Security Council can mandate the use of force against the party that it decides
is the aggressor.62
Thus, the U.N. Charter outlines when countries may use force and provides
guidance for action when the Charter has been breached. And from a purely
textual perspective, it appears that international law bans the interstate use of
force except in two circumstances: in self-defense or with the approval of the
Security Council, as long as it finds a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace,
or act of aggression.”63 Importantly, the Charter does authorize the use of force
for any reason, so long as the Security Council approves. Reflecting the era in
which the United Nations was founded, a dispute must have an international
dimension for the world community to have the right to intervene.
While the Charter is clearly the most important treaty that matters
regarding the legality of interstate uses of force, it is difficult to infer the rules
of customary international law. Criticisms have been raised regarding the
determination of what rules, norms, or practices qualify.64 These criticisms
have caused some scholars to disfavor the use of customary international law
as a means of legal analysis.65 Traditional criteria provide little guidance in
determining how broadly or narrowly to treat an international precedent.66 For
example, NATO’s bombing of Kosovo can be seen as evidence that customary
practice allows: (1) general humanitarian intervention; (2) an alliance of states
to attack an individual state without Security Council approval; or (3) a
federation of democracies to attack a non-democracy.67 Even this list does not
exhaust the universe of plausible interpretations. Without something equivalent
to the U.S. Supreme Court to decide how precedents apply, there is no way to

60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67

Id. art. 51
Id. art. 39.
Id. art. 42.
Id. art. 39.
See GLENNON, supra note 5, at 41–42.
Id. at 42–45.
Id. at 50.
See GLENNON, supra note 5, at 49–51.
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single out any one of the possible interpretations for any particular state act as
“correct.”68
Even if state practice can be established, there is still the difficulty of
determining whether states comply with a rule out a sense of moral obligation.
For instance, in the domestic sphere, public choice theorists have shown that
there will be situations where a legislature cannot be said to have an “intent”
behind its laws.69 Similarly, it follows that a state’s actions on the international
plane may have no clear intent behind them. Some individuals within a
government may be acting out of moral conviction, while others might agree
with the first group out of self-interest or a desire not to disturb superiors.
States might engage in or refrain from an act for any number of reasons, or no
real individual reason at all.
Ignoring the logic of public choice and assuming that a sovereign intent
always exists still does not solve the problem. Psychological motives of world
leaders are hard to prove and another explanation of why a state acted the way
it did could always be created. For example, if states do not regularly invade
the territory of others, an international lawyer might argue that this shows that
the test of opinio juris is satisfied. But as Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner point
out, this could reflect, among other things, a coincidence of interests or an
equilibrium resulting from a repeated, bilateral prisoner’s dilemma.70 If two
neighboring states with similar levels of military and economic power refrain
from attacking one another, it is plausible that they avoid war because a costbenefit calculation on each side shows invading to be illogical. For the
purposes of customary international law, however, this restraint must be the
result of a sense of moral obligation on the part of rulers, and there is no reason
to assume that this is the case simply because state practice is consistent with
such a theory.
A final problem with the concept of customary international law is that it
may seem doubtful that the world community—representing all of the globe’s
different cultures, traditions and histories—can actually agree on many

68

Id. at 51–52.
Frank H. Easterbrook, Statute’s Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 547 1983) (“Because
legislatures
comprise many members, they do not have ‘intents’ or ‘designs’ hidden yet discoverable.”). But see Daniel A.
Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423, 425 (1988) (“[T]he
notion of a coherent legislative intent is consistent with current public choice theory.”).
70 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 3, at 26–35.
69
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norms.71 This is not the same as philosophical cultural relativism. Even natural
law theorists see international law as consent based.72 What it does mean is
that opinio juris depends on what states believe is moral, regardless of whether
we hold that certain cultural values are “wrong” in any absolute sense. It seems
correct that while we may have been able to establish rules of customary
international law when the only states that mattered were European or
European-derived, a more inclusive analysis would be much more difficult.
The theories underlying both sources of international law, treaties and
custom, presume that international law does not have a third-party enforcer.73
This leads to the realist criticism that international law has little to no effect on
the behavior of world leaders.74 This view discounts the possibility of state
enforcement because of the collective action problems involved.75 It seems
intuitively correct that if the international community consistently punishes
certain behavior, only then can that behavior be considered unlawful. The
plausibility of this vision is today questioned by realists, while in earlier times
scholars argued against its normative desirability.76 Not only did traditional
international law often ignore the possibility of states acting as enforcers, but
Vattel considered such a proposition immoral.77 Despite these concerns, if
states consistently punish certain kinds of actions, and a ready explanation
based on state interests appears to be lacking, an inference may be drawn that
leaders are acting out of normative considerations. This is especially true if a
series of independent international norms are logically consistent with one
another, all seeming to rely on a larger coherent moral framework.78
The early nineteenth century saw legal positivism rise to prominence, and
international law was swept up with the larger trend.79 Representing that same
approach a century later, Kelsen argued that law could be distinguished from
other societal practices that attempt to shape behavior, such as norms and
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Kelly, supra note 51, at 466–75.
See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 3, at 26.
73 Id. at 3.
74 See, e.g., GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 3, at 3.
75 See STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 16, at 1–3.
76 VATTEL, supra note 48, at 256.
77 Id. at 265.
78 See infra Part II.A.
79 Josef L. Kunz, Natural-Law Thinking in the Modern Science of International Law, 55 AM. J. INT’L L.
947, 952 (1961).
72
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rational persuasion, by the element of coercion.80 A certain act is a delict when
it is accompanied by a sanction handed out by a valid authority.81 Under this
analysis the question of whether international law exists depends on whether
certain acts considered violations of the norms of the world community are
actually punished.82 International organizations may legitimize coercion, but
individual states must act as the sanctioners.83
A. Mark Weisburd adopts this positivist approach to determine the state of
the law in the area of interstate armed conflict.84 To find general patterns about
whether some kinds of force consistently draw meaningful sanctions, he
documents over 110 instances of states using force against one another
between 1945 and 1991.85 Under the “obey-or-be sanctioned” standard, these
punishments have to go beyond mere rhetorical condemnation and
significantly hamper the aggressor’s war effort or other goals.86 Just because
some states use force against others does not mean that there are no rules of
international law regarding the use of force,87 in the same way that people
occasionally kill one another despite the illegality of murder. Such an analysis
ignores the applicable sanctions along with the deterrence these sanctions
achieve. In the words of Hans Kelsen:
If a definite conduct is prescribed or permitted, the possibility of a
contrary conduct is of course presupposed. If theft were impossible,
the norm “You shall not steal” would be meaningless . . . . Only
because a certain conduct is made by law the condition of a sanction
is this conduct a delict, or what amounts to the same, is this behavior
88
legally prohibited.

We may add that, for a rule to qualify as law, it is not necessary that every
single time it is violated, punishment follows. All that is necessary is that
sanctions are able to stop and deter instances of the unlawful behavior to some
80 Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence, 55 HARV. L. REV. 44, 57–58
(1941) (“[T]he essential characteristic of law, by which it is distinguished from all other social mechanisms, is
the fact that it seeks to bring about socially desired conduct by acting against contrary socially undesired
conduct—the delict—with a sanction which the individual involved will deem an evil.”).
81 Id.; KELSEN, supra note 2, at 6–7.
82 KELSEN, supra note 2, at 16–17.
83 Id. at 20.
84 See A. MARK WEISBURD, USE OF FORCE : THE PRACTICE OF STATES SINCE WORLD WAR II, at 4 (1997).
85 Id. at 308.
86 See id. at 8.
87 See FRANCK, supra note 7; GLENNON, supra note 5.
88 KELSEN, supra note 2, at 6–7.
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satisfactory degree. Little more can be asked of any norm worthy of being
called “law.”
In determining the state of the law regarding the interstate use of force, the
methodology adopted here gives credence to both the text and original intent of
the U.N. Charter and the obey-or-be sanctioned standard. This Article rejects
the position that only the U.N. Charter can determine what is lawful.89 The
U.N. Charter at the very least carries normative weight with the world
community. This is reflected, for example, in the condemnation of the United
States for its 2003 invasion of Iraq without Security Council approval.90
Diplomats and leaders reference the text of the U.N. Charter along with what
the Security Council has done to argue for or against different policies.91 On
the other hand, focusing only on the U.N. Charter is to maintain formal
coherence at the cost of real world relevance. Glennon is correct that not all,
and probably not most, violations of the strict letter of Article 2(4) are
punished.92 But to classify all interstate uses of force—the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, the United States overthrowing the Taliban government, Saudi
Arabia sending troops to Bahrain to crush a Shiite rebellion, etc.—the same
way would be a conceptual mistake.
For instance, Weisburd has divided all interstate uses of force between
1945 and 1991 into different categories to see whether some kinds of attacks
are more acceptable to the world community than others.93 In the process of
reviewing his work, his main findings can be connected to other international
relations scholarship and provide a similar analysis of humanitarian
intervention, a type of war that was rare to nonexistent before the end of the
Cold War. While there is some arbitrariness involved in Weisburd’s method of
dividing instances of interstate uses of force into different categories, this does
not prevent classification.94 While certain wars will fall at the margins of any
category in which they are placed, classifications are both possible and

89

See Oscar Schachter, In Defense of International Rules on the Use of Force, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 113,
130 (1986) (arguing that state conduct cannot nullify Article 2(4)).
90 See, e.g., CLYDE V. PRESTOWITZ, ROGUE NATION: AMERICAN UNILATERALISM AND THE FAILURE OF
GOOD INTENTIONS 276–77 (2004); Yoo, supra note 11, at 729–30.
91 Cf. Schachter, supra note 89, at 118, 121–22 (explaining how states view the text of the U.N. Charter
and Security Council resolutions).
92 See GLENNON, supra note 5, at 61–62.
93 WEISBURD, supra note 84, at 25–27.
94 See infra Part I.B.
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necessary, and, as seen below, can show normative agreement among members
of the international community.
Furthermore, the text of the U.N. Charter is inadequate to determine the
state of international law regarding the use of force, because doubts existed on
whether the United Nations would eliminate all war at the time of the U.N.’s
founding. Several founding U.N. members seemingly violated the plain text of
Article 2(4) within the first decade of the organization’s existence. For
example, Great Britain unilaterally used force against Yemen in 1949 and the
United States did so against Guatemala in 1954.95 While this may simply be
explained away as great power hypocrisy, the history of the founding of the
United Nations indicates that Article 2(4) was meant to apply mainly to the
kinds of conflict that had triggered the two world wars—what is referred to
below as the classic invasion.96 It is not realistic to believe that the U.N.
founders thought that they would succeed in abolishing all kinds of interstate
armed conflict, even if the concept may have been seen as an ideal to aspire
towards.
In the methodology used here, when a type of state conduct both violates
the Charter and draws international sanctions, then it can unquestionably be
considered illegal. On the other hand, when a type of action is allowed by the
Charter and state practice, it is lawful under international law. The most
difficult cases, of course, are those where the U.N. Charter and state practice
diverge, as what arguably has happened in the case of humanitarian
intervention. While any definitive answer on the legality of these kinds of grey
area conflicts will have to depend on methodological preferences, it is deeply
problematic to consider humanitarian intervention legal, especially when
carried out without Security Council approval.
B. The Illegality of Classic Invasions
Because the United Nations was created in reaction to World War II, an
analysis of the legality of war should start with the case of the classic invasion,
which is the kind of conflict that conforms best to the idea of what a
prototypical “war” is. Precise, universally recognized national borders are a
relatively recent phenomenon, dating back to no earlier than the eighteenth

95
96

WEISBURD, supra note 84, at 209–11, 255.
See infra Part I.B.

HANANIA GALLEYSPROOFS

846

4/14/2014 10:24 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

century.97 From the time these first borders were drawn to the signing of the
U.N. Charter, disputes over territory were the main causes of war.98 This is
why the Charter bans the use of force against the “territorial integrity or
political independence of any state.”99 The implication of the text is that, for an
aggressor state to be violating Article 2(4), the target country must already
have a certain degree of “territorial integrity” and/or “political independence.”
“And” makes more sense than “or” in this context because the implication of
Article 2(4) is that a fully formed sovereign state has both. By violating the
“territorial integrity or political independence” of a well-established state, an
aggressor is thus acting in a way inconsistent with international law.
Weisburd discusses ten cases of “classic invasions” in the world between
1945 and 1991.100 He defines classic invasions as conflicts which satisfy the
following six conditions: (1) The war involves a border crossing by regular
troops of the state(s) initiating the use of force; (2) the border(s) crossed
separate states; (3) the border(s) crossed have been recognized by the
combatants for some time; (4) the purpose of the invasion is either to subjugate
the state invaded, to seize a portion of its territory, or to replace an unfriendly
government; (5) the invaded state, did not, prior to the invasion, stand in a
position of de facto subordination to the invading state; and (6) the conflict
cannot be seen as a continuation of earlier hostilities between the combatants
that had ended without resolving the basic disputes between them.101
This Article will add one more part to Weisburd’s definition: the war must
not be a humanitarian intervention.102 The analysis leads to some important
conclusions. First, few classic invasions have occurred at all. Over a forty-six
year period, there have been ten classic invasions, averaging to one every 4.6
years. The break with the past is more striking considering that there are more
states today than there were before the founding of the United Nations. Just as
importantly, six of the postwar classic invasions were met with significant
international sanctions, which went beyond moral condemnation of the

97 Mark W. Zacher, The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force, 55
INT’L ORG. 215, 216 (2001).
98 Id. at 217–18.
99 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
100 WEISBURD, supra note 84, at 28–59.
101 Id. at 28.
102 See infra Part I.C.
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aggressor.103 In five of those six cases, the sanctions from the international
community were an important reason behind the failure of the aggressor state’s
war effort.104
Perhaps the postwar conflict closest to the ideal of the prototypical classic
invasion has been Iraq’s attempt to annex Kuwait in 1990.105 One universally
recognized sovereign entity with clear borders attempted to use force to annex
and end the independent legal existence of another.106 On August 2, 1990,
Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait.107 A few days later, the Security Council
responded by announcing its intent “to restore the authority of the legitimate
Government of Kuwait” and to that end adopted heavy economic sanctions
against the aggressor.108 After a few weeks, it authorized a naval blockade,
which twenty-three states helped enforce,109 and finally, in Resolution 678,
threatened military action if Iraq did not withdraw from Kuwait by January 15,
1991.110 After that deadline passed, an international coalition finally enforced
these resolutions and expelled Saddam Hussein’s army, restoring the Kuwaiti
government.111 The Iraqi forces were badly overmatched and the entire effort
took less than two months.112 There was consensus on the need to use military
force among a broad cross section of states. Resolution 678 was opposed by
only two non-permanent members of the Security Council113 and supported by
all the permanent members except China, who abstained from the vote. The
mission included financial or military support from, among others, the United
States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Canada,
South Korea, and Australia.114 Eastern, Western, and Arab states agreed that
one member of the United Nations annexing another by force was
unacceptable.115

103

WEISBURD, supra note 84, at 58–62.
Id. at 59.
105 In a world that accepted Hobbesian anarchy in international relations such an invasion would have
drawn little third-party concern. See infra Part I.G.
106 See WEISBURD, supra note 84, at 55–56.
107 Id. at 56.
108 S.C. Res. 661, paras. 2–5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (Aug. 6, 1990).
109 S.C. Res. 665, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/665 (Aug. 25, 1990); WEISBURD, supra note 84, at 57.
110 S.C. Res. 678, paras. 2–3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (Nov. 29, 1990).
111 WEISBURD, supra note 84, at 56–57.
112 See id.
113 Those members were Yemen and Cuba.
114 WEISBURD, supra note 84, at 56–57.
115 See id. at 57–58.
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The 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan similarly saw wide-ranging
sanctions applied against the aggressor. This example further proves the
existence of a ban on classic invasions, because it involves a state much more
economically and militarily powerful than Iraq was at the time of the Gulf
War. In June 1978, rural Afghans began a revolt against their Marxist
government, which itself had only recently come to power in a coup.116 About
a year and a half later, the Soviet government invaded to preserve Afghanistan
as a functioning communist border-state.117 The opponents of the Afghan
Marxists and Soviets, mostly religiously-motivated guerillas collectively
known as the mujahideen, received arms from China, the United States,
Pakistan, and Iran.118 Also in reaction to the war, the United States pulled out
of an arms treaty it was in the process of negotiating with the Soviet Union.119
The Soviet Union also suffered economic sanctions at the hands of the United
States, Canada, and the European Community, and diplomatic sanctions from
several states, including those represented by Western, communist, and Islamic
governments.120 In each year from 1980 to 1987, the General Assembly passed
a resolution calling for all foreign troops to withdraw from Afghanistan.121 All
of this pressure is thought to have contributed to Mikhail Gorbachev’s decision
to pull all his soldiers out of Afghanistan in the late 1980s.122
Both the Iraqi and Soviet invasions saw third-party sanctions on the
aggressor state that were used as a conduit for expressing, and sometimes
enforcing, the positions of the international community.123 Considerations of
power may explain why Iraq was invaded because of its actions but the Soviet
Union was not. Regardless, even the Soviets were sanctioned for invading a
state that was, as an independent force, powerless on the international plane.
With such overwhelming global reactions to classic invasions, it is not
surprising that wars fought over territory have ceased to exist, resulting in a

116

Id. at 44.
Id. at 45.
118 Id. at 45–46.
119 Id. at 46.
120 Id. In addition to more traditional forms of sanctions, many states even boycotted the 1980 Moscow
Olympics. Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 661, U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (Aug. 6, 1990) (sanctions against Iraq); see also
WEISBURD, supra note 84, at 45–46; Libby Hennemuth, 1980 U.S. Partial Grain Embargo, THE MONITOR,
Summer 2012, at 44, available at http://web.wm.edu/so/monitor/issues/17-2/4-hennemuth.pdf.
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“territorial integrity norm.”124 Between 1648 and 1945, ninety-three out of 119
armed conflicts could be classified as “territorial wars,” defined as wars
“concerned with . . . issues that clearly involve state control over territory.”125
Eighty percent of territorial conflicts resulted in a redistribution of territory.126
But for the time period from 1945 to 2000, there were forty territorial wars,
and less than thirty percent led to a change in international borders.127 Even the
few post-World War II cases of territorial aggrandizement through war were
concentrated during the period of decolonization.128 Since 1976, no country
has successfully used force to take territory from another state.129 Perhaps even
more impressively, no country has disappeared as a result of conquest since
1945.130 The normal international reaction to classic invasions explains why.
These are no small accomplishments. The two world wars were essentially
territorial conflicts between the world’s most powerful states.131 But as of
2012, no two superpowers have fought one another on the battlefield for fiftynine years, the longest such streak in recorded history.132 And classic invasions
have not only disappeared among the major states but amongst practically all
countries. International sanctions must figure heavily in any state’s cost-benefit
calculation regarding whether or not to overthrow a neighbor or seize its
territory. The only mystery that remains to be solved is why third-parties have
been willing to act as enforcers, when rational choice theory would expect
states to shirk any responsibility for maintaining international stability.133
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Zacher, supra note 97, at 215.
Id. at 218, 223.
126 Id. at 223.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 245.
129 Id. at 244. This is not to say that there have not been cases of international borders being redrawn as
the result of a region breaking away from a larger state. In 2011, for example, the international community
recognized the independence of South Sudan. Jeffrey Gettleman, Newest Nation Is Full of Hope and Problems,
N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2011, at A1.
130 STEVEN PINKER, THE BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE: WHY VIOLENCE HAS DECLINED 251 (2011)
(noting that the unification of South Vietnam and North Vietnam may be an exception depending upon how
the conflict between the two states is characterized).
131 See, e.g., John C. Duncan, Jr., Following a Sigmoid Progression: Some Jurisprudential and Practical
Considerations Regarding Territorial Acquisition Among Nation-States, 35 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 6,
26–27, 31–32.
132 See PINKER, supra note 130, at 250.
133 See supra text accompanying notes 15–17.
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C. The Lack of International Consensus on Humanitarian Intervention
After the end of the Cold War, the idea of humanitarian intervention
became popular among Western leaders and opinion-makers.134 A
humanitarian intervention has been defined as a situation where a state or
coalition of states invades a country without the permission of the target
government to nominally, “and at least to some extent actually,” stop some sort
of atrocity.135 Because such wars involve major violations of sovereignty and
often result in the overthrow of the offending government, these wars can fit
the definition of a classic invasion.136
Since the end of the Cold War, however, analysis of the legality of the use
of force has removed humanitarian interventions from the larger category of
classic invasions. International lawyers have given the topic its own
specialized focus.137 And while the world community’s reactions, both
rhetorically and with regards to sanctions, to classic invasions have been
overwhelmingly negative, powerful states have supported using force against
sovereign governments for the sake of defending human rights. Therefore,
humanitarian intervention should have its own special category.
There have been at least three cases of humanitarian interventions in the
post-Cold War era: the international community’s intervention in Somalia and
NATO’s wars against the governments of the former Yugoslavia and Libya. In
the cases of Somalia and Libya, the missions at least partly had the blessings of
the United Nations, while the bombing of Kosovo did not.138 With or without
Security Council approval, humanitarian interventions appear to be illegal

134 See Richard Hanania, Humanitarian Intervention and the War Powers Debate, 13 J. JURISPRUDENCE
47, 79 (2012).
135 Id. (citing D.J.B. Trim & Brendan Simms, Towards a History of Humanitarian Intervention, in
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: A HISTORY 4 (Brendan Simms & D.J.B. Trim eds., 2011))
136 While Weisburd noted the humanitarian justifications made for the 1978 Vietnamese invasion of
Cambodia and Tanzania’s overthrowing of Idi Amin’s Ugandan regime, he did not see these motivations as
warranting the creation of a new category. See WEISBURD, supra note 84, at 40–44.
137 See, e.g., Saban Kardas, Examining the Role of the UN Security Council in Post Cold-War
Interventions: The Case for Authorized Humanitarian Intervention, 2010 USAK Y.B. INT’L POL. & L. 55, 55
138 See S.C. Res. 794, UN Doc. S/RES/794 (Dec. 3, 1992) (approving partial armed humanitarian
intervention in Somalia); S.C. Res. 1973, UN Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011) (approving humanitarian
intervention in Libya); Mohammad Taghi Karoubi, Unilateral Use of Armed Force and the Challenge of
Humanitarian Intervention in International Law, 2001–2002 ASIAN Y.B. INT’L L. 95, 113–14 (discussing U.N.
disapproval of Kosovo bombing).
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under the plain meaning of the text of the U.N. Charter.139 Not only does the
document ban the use of force except in self-defense or when the Security
Council finds a threat to international security, but it states that “[n]othing
contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene
in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state.”140
According to the Charter, the United Nations has no role in stopping
intrastate humanitarian disasters. Further evidence against the legality of
humanitarian intervention comes from the documents relating to the Charter’s
founding.141 While originalism142 has been put in different terms when applied
to treaties, the justification for its use as a tool to analyze the U.N. Charter is
just as strong as the justifications commonly offered for the method in
domestic constitutional law. If countries are morally or legally bound to obey
treaties, because they previously agreed to them, then they can only be obliged
to follow the terms to which they consented. This idea has long been accepted
by the international community. The Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, for example, allows the preparatory work from the time of adoption
to be used in the interpretation of treaties.143
Scholars who have examined the travaux préparatoires of the U.N. Charter
and other historical evidence have shown that the founders did not believe that
they had created an organization that was to deal primarily,144 if at all, with

139

U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7.
Id.
141 THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS AND ARMED ATTACKS
136 (2003).
142 In domestic American law, “originalism” refers to a method of analysis that determines legal
principles by looking to the original meaning at the time of the adoption of the United States Constitution and
its later amendments. See generally Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849
(1989).
143 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 32, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S 331; see also Tom J.
Farer, Human Rights in Law’s Empire: The Jurisprudence War, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 117, 117 (1991). While the
Vienna Convention does not apply to the U.N. Charter, and has not been ratified by all countries, it was
“largely a consolidation of the existing customary international law of treaties.” Herbert W. Briggs, Unilateral
Denunciation of Treaties: The Vienna Convention and the International Court of Justice, 68 AM. J. INT’L L.
51, 51–52 (1974).
144 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PUB. NO. 2297, THE UNITED NATIONS DUMBARTON OAKS PROPOSALS FOR A
GENERAL INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, U.N. DOC. JURIST 2, G/2 (Conf. Ser. No. 66, 1945 ), reprinted in 14
U.N. COMM. OF JURISTS, DOCUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION, SAN FRANCISCO, 1945, at 453 (1945).
140

HANANIA GALLEYSPROOFS

852

4/14/2014 10:24 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

intrastate human rights violations.145 For example, in deliberations preceding
the adoption of the Charter, members of the U.S. Senate suggested that “a
threat of force or violence” was necessary for the United Nations to interfere in
the affairs of a state.146 In the words of Tom Farer, “if one deems the original
intention of the founding members to be controlling with respect to the
legitimate occasions for the use of force, humanitarian intervention is
illegal.”147
Of course, one could reject using only the travaux préparatoires to
determine the meaning of the U.N. Charter. Thomas Franck calls the Charter a
“living document” and argues that, unlike most international agreements, it
created a brand new international organization and was meant to keep pace
with evolving norms.148 The second clause of Article 2(7), after all, says that
the principle of nonintervention does not apply when the United Nations is
undertaking “enforcement measures under Chapter VII,” the part of the
document which allows the Security Council to decide when a “threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” exists.149 Therefore, Franck
argues that humanitarian interventions approved by the Security Council can
be considered legal, even if the definitions of the terms in the phrase “threat to
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” need to be expanded from
their original meanings.150 On the other hand, Franck maintains that
humanitarian interventions not approved by the Security Council are not
permitted by the U.N. Charter.151
The argument about the legality of humanitarian intervention with the
consent of the Security Council comes down to whether the organization is
allowed to define its own mission and whether we should give greater weight
to original meaning of the U.N. Charter or current state practices. In practical
terms, if the Security Council approves of a war, that means that all the major
powers are in agreement. Under such circumstances, the intervention will take
place and no state or coalition can be expected to stop it. Also, such an effort
145

See FRANCK, supra note 141; Farer, supra note 143, at 119–20 (“Nothing in the travaux préparatoires
suggests that the parties envisioned a government’s treatment of its own nationals as a likely catalyst of a
threat or breach.”).
146 GLENNON, supra note 5, at 108–09.
147 Farer, supra note 143, at 121.
148 FRANCK, supra note 141, at 6–7.
149 U.N. Charter art. 2 para. 7, art. 39.
150 FRANCK, supra note 141, at 5.
151 Id. at 135–39.
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can be expected to have a great deal of legitimacy. Therefore, arguing about
legality under such circumstances has few real world implications. If all major
powers support a humanitarian intervention, it will happen and the attacking
states will not face sanctions as a result. However, in cases where the
permanent members of the Security Council disagree on the need to use
military force to stop an atrocity, we can still benefit from a debate about
legality.
Under the obey-or-be sanctioned standard, humanitarian intervention, with
or without Security Council approval, should not be considered illegal. The
instigators of the three main wars of the post-Cold War era that fall into this
category have not been sanctioned. The 1990s intervention in Somalia was
supported and legitimized by several Security Council resolutions.152 While the
NATO intervention in Kosovo was condemned by Russia, China, and India,153
the United States and its allies did not suffer serious consequences. Finally,
although certain countries complained during and after the attack on Libya,
NATO was not seriously sanctioned for overthrowing Muammar Gaddafi.154
Therefore, while humanitarian intervention may be illegal under the text
and original meaning U.N. Charter, it is permitted under the obey-or-be
sanctioned standard. The United States and its allies have not faced serious
consequences for imposing their will on or even overthrowing weaker states to
stop governments from committing atrocities against their own citizens. Still, it
is difficult to believe that less powerful countries would be able to violate the
sovereignty of other states with impunity even if they made a plausible case
that they were defending human rights.
Even if we treat the U.N. Charter as a “living constitution,” it does not
follow that humanitarian intervention has become legal through state practice.
A “living constitution” at least requires that a significant portion of the relevant
152 See S.C. Res. 794, U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (Dec. 3, 1992); S.C. Res. 751, U.N. Doc. S/RES/751 (Apr.
24, 1992); S.C. Res. 746, para. 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/746 (Mar. 17, 1992); S.C. Res. 733, U.N. Doc. S/RES/733
(Jan. 23, 1992).
153 See NATO Air Strikes—The World Reacts, B.B.C. NEWS (Mar. 25, 1999, 4:47 PM), http://news.bbc.co.
uk/2/hi/303446.stm.
154 See, e.g., Scott Bobb, Several African Leaders Criticize Air Attacks in Libya, VOICE OF AM. (Mar. 22,
2011, 8:00 PM), http://www.voanews.com/content/several-african-leaders-criticize-air-attacks-in-libya118435599/136876.html (“South African President Jacob Zuma has warned that the Western-led bombings of
Libyan military installations must not target civilians.”); Patrick Wintour & Ewen MacAskill, Gaddafi May
Become Target of Air Strikes, Liam Fox Admits, GUARDIAN (Mar. 20, 2011, 5:37 PM), http://www.guardian.
co.uk/world/2011/mar/20/coalition-criticism-arab-league-libya?INTCMP=SRCH.

HANANIA GALLEYSPROOFS

854

4/14/2014 10:24 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

community actually accept any change. Despite the broad support for
humanitarian intervention on the part of NATO member-states, the concept has
been more controversial in Russia and China,155 which are two of the five
permanent members of the Security Council and together make up nearly a
quarter of the world’s population. In reaction to the Kosovo War, “114
member states of the Non-Aligned Movement condemned humanitarian
intervention in 2000.”156 The Somalia intervention may have had international
support, but at the time, the country had no functioning government.157
International forces did cross an established border, but no authority had
enough effective control over the country for us to be able to say that its
sovereign rights were violated.158 The agreement of the United States, Great
Britain, and a handful of other Western states does not alone form an
international consensus.
The legal status of humanitarian intervention stands in sharp contrast to that
of classic invasions. Without any kind of international consensus regarding
humanitarian wars, efforts to protect civilians from their own government are
taken on an ad hoc basis and usually controversial. At best, there is a spectrum
of legality in this area of law, with Security Council-approved missions and
those in countries with no functioning governments more legal than those
undertaken when the opposite conditions apply. But certainly all humanitarian
interventions could be considered illegal, due to both the plain text and original
understanding of the U.N. Charter.159 The obey-or-be sanctioned standard
leads to a different conclusion, however, and there is no clear guidance as to
whether this should trump the treaty-based method for determining legality.
D. The International Community and Responses to Terrorism
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter protects “the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense” once a state has been subject to an “armed attack,” at

155

See GLENNON, supra note 5, at 156–60 (discussing the “attitudinal gap” toward international human
rights between the West and Russia and China in the context NATO’s Kosovo intervention).
156 Id. at 158.
157 Valerie J. Lofland, Somalia: U.S. Intervention and Operation Restore Hope, in CASE STUDIES IN
POLICYMAKING AND IMPLEMENTATION 53, 54 (David A. Williams, ed. 6th ed. 2002), available at
www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/navy/pmi/somalia1.pdf; Fernando R. Teson, Collective Humanitarian
Intervention, 17 MICH. J. INT’L L. 323, 348–49 (1998).
158 Id.
159 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4; see also FRANCK, supra note 141.
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least until the Security Council has had the opportunity to address the issue.160
Because the United Nations was formed in reaction to World War II, it is
possible to conclude that “armed attack” originally referred to a case of stateon-state violence.161 Unsurprisingly, events over the last few decades have led
many scholars to argue that the rights granted under Article 51 are insufficient
for purposes of modern self-defense against threats such as terrorism.162 Unlike
the case of humanitarian intervention, however, there has been very little
international condemnation of the principle of fighting terrorism and no
evidence that the founders of the United Nations considered and rejected the
idea that states should be able to respond to such threats.
Between 1945 and 1991, the international community did not sanction
states that took limited action in response to terrorist attacks.163 Examples
include the United Kingdom’s attacks against Yemen in 1949 and 1957, the
United States’ 1986 bombing of Libya, and several Israeli strikes against its
Arab neighbors.164
In more recent years, the practice of using force to respond to terrorism has
only grown in acceptance. Only one day after the attacks of September 11, the
Security Council passed a resolution that affirmed the right to respond in selfdefense, called terrorism “a threat to international peace and security,” and
expressed the Council’s “readiness to take all necessary steps to respond to the
terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, and to combat all forms of
terrorism.”165 A few weeks later, it passed Resolution 1373, which called on all

160

U.N. Charter art. 51.
See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of
America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 102–03 (“[I]t may be considered to
be agreed that an armed attack must be understood as including not merely action by regular armed forces
across an international border, but also ‘the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups,
irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to
amount to’ (inter alia) an actual armed attack conducted by regular forces, ‘or its substantial involvement
therein.’ This description, contained in Article 3, paragraph (g), of the Definition of Aggression annexed to
General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX), may be taken to reflect customary international law.”).
162 See, e.g., Mark B. Baker, Terrorism and the Inherent Right of Self-Defense (A Call to Amend Article
51 of the United Nations Charter), 10 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 25 (1987); Yoo, supra note 11, at 751–72.
163 WEISBURD, supra note 84, at 255, 257–58, 271–72, 292–300.
164 Id. On the other hand, when the supposed “terrorists” being attacked were fighting for selfdetermination or the end of Western colonialism, the international community has reacted harshly towards the
aggressor state. See id. at 300–01. With the end of European domination of third-world countries, however,
this deviation from the rule is only of historical interest.
165 S.C. Res. 1368, paras. 1, 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001).
161
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states to take proactive steps to suppress terrorist activity.166 By May 2002, a
coalition of states was occupying Afghanistan and approximately half of the
14,000 foreign troops were non-Americans.167
More than twenty countries have contributed troops to the Afghan War
effort, and dozens more have provided support in the form of intelligence,
logistics, equipment, or permission to fly over airspace.168 All this international
backing came despite the fact that the United States invaded Afghanistan to
overthrow its government, something that is normally illegal under the plain
text of the U.N. Charter.169 A few scholars have argued that the invasion was
not covered under Article 51 or explicitly authorized by the Security Council
and hence illegal.170 But there has been virtually no international resistance to
the American-led effort; pragmatism has triumphed over adherence to the plain
text of the U.N. Charter.171
In addition to invading and occupying Afghanistan, the United States has
been using air drones to target and kill suspected terrorists in Somalia, Yemen,
and Pakistan.172 Although this method of fighting terrorism has drawn
criticism,173 the United States has not suffered any international sanctions as a
result. Perhaps the worst that has happened is that American relations with
Pakistan have become strained, which is unsurprising considering that its
territory has been targeted.174

166

S.C. Res. 1373, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
Ian S. Livingston & Michael O’Hanlon, Afghanistan Index: Also Including Selected Data on Pakistan,
BROOKINGS INST., Figs. 1.1, 1.2, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Programs/foreign%20policy/afghanistan
%20index/index20120930.pdf (last visited Sept. 1, 2013).
168 DEP’T OF DEF., FACT SHEET: INTERNATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM
(May 22, 2002), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/May2002/d20020523cu.pdf; Christopher L.
Gadoury, Should the United States Officially Recognize the Taliban? The International Legal and Political
Considerations, 23 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 385, 386 (2001).
169 It is also likely relevant that, because of its human rights record, only three states recognized the
Taliban at the time of the 2001 invasion. Oliver Roy, The Taliban: A Strategic Tool for Pakistan, in PAKISTAN:
NATIONALISM WITHOUT A NATION? 149, 156 (Christophe Jaffrelot ed., 2002).
170 See GLENNON, supra note 5, at 111–14.
171 See, e.g., Allen S. Weiner, The Use of Force and Contemporary Security Threats, 59 STAN. L. REV.
415, 457 (2006).
172 See Declan Walsh, Major Review By Pakistan Calls for End to Drone Hits, N.Y. TIMES INT’L, Mar.
21, 2012, at A8.
173 See, e.g., Sikander Ahmed Shah, War on Terrorism: Self Defense, Operation Enduring Freedom, and
the Legality of U.S. Drone Attacks in Pakistan, 9 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 77, 123–26 (2010).
174 See Walsh, supra note 172, at A8.
167
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A cynic may argue that the only reason that the international community
accepts wars fought in reaction to terrorist threats is because the war on terror
has the backing of the United States. This theory that American hegemony
drives international norms does not, however, explain why states have been
vocal in opposing both American humanitarian interventions and the 2003
invasion of Iraq,175 even if the other countries have not been powerful enough
to actually sanction the United States. One may conclude that considerations of
power preclude sanctions against the United States, but we should also reject
the idea that America is powerful enough to force other states to cooperate
with its endeavors or chill the speech of those who would otherwise be critical
of its policies.
Another reason to reject a strong version of the American power hypothesis
is that countries less powerful than the United States have used force against
other states in the name of fighting terrorism and not faced third-party
sanctions. In the 1990s, after the international community had failed to leave
behind a stable government in Somalia, much of the country came under the
rule of Islamists.176 Concerned with how the situation would affect its own
security interests, Ethiopia invaded its neighbor in December 2006.177 Ethiopia
was able to quickly seize the capital Mogadishu, where it tried to prop up the
internationally supported Transitional Federal Government.178 After a
prolonged insurgency, Ethiopia withdrew its forces in early 2009 without
leaving behind a functional government and with Islamists still exercising
control over parts of Somalia.179 Shortly after the Ethiopian invasion, the
Security Council called for an African Union peacekeeping force to help
support the Transitional Federal Government in Somalia.180 After the
deployment of African peacemakers, the United Nations generally stood on the
sidelines, its officials promising to send a peacekeeping force once the
situation stabilized.181 In October 2011, the United States and France provided

175

See Richard Falk, The World Speaks on Iraq, 62 GUILD PRAC. 91, 93 (2005).
Bronwyn Bruton, In the Quicksands of Somalia: Where Doing Less Helps More, 88 FOREIGN AFF. 79,
82 (2009).
177 Mike Pflanz, Ethiopia Intervenes in Somali Civil War, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 26, 2006, at 6.
178 Bruton, supra note 176, at 84.
179 Id. at 85.
180 S.C. Res. 1744, ¶ 3–5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1744 (Feb. 20, 2007); Scott Baldauf & Alexis Okeowo, Can
African Peacekeepers Tame Somalia?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 12, 2007, at 7.
181 Rob Crilly, U.N. Faces Calls for Action in Somalia, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 15, 2007, at 7.
176
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military support as Somalia was invaded once again, this time by its neighbor
Kenya.182
Similar to the backing of the American-led invasion of Afghanistan, the
international community has supported, at least implicitly, violations of
Somalia’s sovereignty in the name of fighting terrorism.183 Likewise, in 2008,
when Turkey determined that certain elements among the Kurdish population
in northern Iraq were supporting terrorism against the state, it launched
incursions into the area.184 These attacks were generally accepted and even
aided by the United States, who was occupying Iraq and did little more than
put diplomatic pressure on Turkey to quickly end the invasion.185 The
government in Baghdad condemned the attack but did not try to resist or take
any other action.186
Modern terrorism is a novel threat to the international community. The
U.N. founders could not have imagined attacks like those of September 11. At
the same time, the Charter makes clear that states retained the right to selfdefense.187 This right was “inherent,” which implies that it could evolve to take
account of developing norms and technologies in a way that other Charter
provisions could not. Thus, room was left for the international community to
respond to new threats that arguably make the old idea of imminence
outdated.188 When an analysis of the text of Article 51 is combined with the
fact that third-party states do not sanction countries that respond militarily to
terrorist threats, and often even support them, it is clear that using proportional
force against terrorists in other countries fits under the modern rubric of selfdefense.

182 A Big Gamble, ECONOMIST, Oct. 29, 2011, at 60. France was directly reacting to one of its citizens
having been kidnapped and killed by extremists in that country. Id. at 60–61.
183 See Jeffrey Gettleman, World Leaders Are Meeting in a Script All Too Familiar to Somalis, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 23, 2012, at A8.
184 Turkey Invades Northern Iraq, ECONOMIST, Mar. 1, 2008, at 51.
185 Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Mark Mazzetti, Gates Urges Turkey to End Its Iraq Invasion by Mid-March,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2008, at A10.
186 Id. Of course, Baghdad’s passivity may partly be explained by the weakness of the central government.
As of 2008, the Iraqi state did not have well-functioning institutions and maintained little control over the
Kurdish north of the country.
187 See U.N. Charter art. 51.
188 See John C. Yoo, Force Rules: U.N. Reform and Intervention, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 641, 649–54 (2006)
(arguing for updating the imminence standard that applied at the founding of the U.N.).
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The U.N. Charter explicitly rejects the idea that one state could use force to
interfere in the internal affairs of another.189 But it affirms an inherent right to
self-defense that had long-standing legitimacy amongst the members of the
international community at the time of the U.N.’s founding.190 With the rise of
concerns over radical Islamic extremism, the international community has
become more explicit in its acceptance of and support for preemptive and
retaliatory strikes against terrorist targets.191 By attacking a country that
harbors and supports terrorists, a state directly neutralizes the target and deters
similar action in the future. Even before the attacks of September 11, such uses
of force against other states were widely accepted and never sanctioned.192
E. The Grey Areas
In determining the legality of different kinds of interstate uses of force, this
article uses the obey-or-be sanctioned standard and the U.N. Charter as
guideposts. The rules can be summed up as follows:
1. Classic invasions are illegal.193
2. Limited strikes against terrorist targets are legal.194
3. Other uses of force, including humanitarian intervention, cannot be said
to be legal or illegal.
Relying on these rules, the third category, the “grey areas,” includes the use
of interstate force in the following circumstances:
A. Third-party states supporting third world insurgencies or intrastate
struggles against colonial and apartheid governments are not sanctioned.195

189

U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
U.N. Charter art. 51.
191 See, e.g., Andrea Armstrong & W. Michael Reisman, The Past and Future of the Claim of Preemptive
Self-Defense, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 525, 537–56 (2006).
192 See WEISBURD, supra note 84, at 255, 257–58, 271–72, 292–300.
193 These are wars in which one country’s soldiers or weapons cross the established borders of another to
overthrow the government of the target state or seize its territory. This category does not include wars that are
humanitarian interventions, continuations of previous conflicts, or can be interpreted as a major power using
force to maintain a traditional sphere of influence.
194 There is a principal of proportionality: After a major attack like that of September 11, the United States
received international support for overthrowing the Taliban. Usually, terrorist attacks kill fewer people and
retaliations or preemptive actions are more restrained.
190
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B. Third-party intervention in a civil war on one side or another is not
sanctioned, provided that the intervention does not rise to the level of a classic
invasion.196
C. Major powers are not sanctioned for using force to maintain their
spheres of influence.197
D. The instigators of “neo-colonial” wars are not sanctioned.198
E. There is no consistent pattern of sanctions regarding the use of force in
“post-imperial” wars.199
F. There are generally no sanctions for aggressors in situations where the
attack can be seen as the continuation of a previous conflict that was left
unsettled.200
F. The General Pattern
International law scholars who decry the failure of international law to
restrain the interstate use of force point to the absolute numbers of armed
conflicts in the world and cases of countries violating the text of the U.N.
Charter with impunity.201 The list above appears to show that these critics have
a point.202 The initiation of interstate humanitarian interventions or wars that fit

195 Between 1945 and 1991, European or European-derived people used interstate force to maintain
colonies or apartheid governments in fifteen conflicts. Id. at 63–96. In each situation, the non-European side
received significant support from third-parties, who were never sanctioned. Id. With the end of European
colonialism and apartheid, this rule has lost any contemporary significance.
196 See id. at 170–208.
197 This includes when the United States invaded Grenada or when the Soviet Union put down the
rebellion in Czechoslovakia. Id. at 219–42. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, however, it was
attacking a state that was not traditionally under its control and therefore sanctioned. Id. at 44–46.
198 These are instances in which third world states have sought to achieve authority over areas not
recognized as states when the wars began. Id. at 243. Two conflicts that fit into this category are Morocco’s
attempts over the decades to subdue Western Sahara and Indonesia’s 1975–83 invasion of East Timor. Id. at
244–51.
199 Id. at 97–118. These are invasions in the immediate aftermath of imperial dissolution, involving the
crossing of borders that lack long-term international acceptance. Id. at 97.
200 Id. at 119–69. In particular, the world has shown a “general acquiescence toward Arab-Israeli
violence.” Id. at 165–66. As in all uses of force that do not draw sanctions, this is not to say that different
combatants have not faced criticism. Israel, for example, is often condemned for its behavior, See, e.g., id. at
138. But third-party states never incur the costs of meting out serious punishment.
201 See supra notes 34–38 and accompanying text.
202 See supra Part I.E.
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into the six other kinds of grey areas above arguably violate the U.N. Charter
since, in the vast majority of cases, the aggressor cannot be said to be acting in
self-defense or with Security Council approval. If the existence of a coherent
doctrine of international law regarding the use of force requires the relevant
rules to be written down in a treaty and violators to always be punished, then
those who say there is no such law are correct. Further, if all armed conflict,
except attacks authorized by the Security Council or justified on the grounds of
self-defense, must be eliminated in order to say that international rules
regarding the use of force exist, then once again the critics of the current
system have it right.
Such criticisms set standards that are too high and go beyond even what the
U.N. founders hoped to accomplish.203 If international law is conceived as a set
of norms that bring sanctions when violated and deter the undesirable acts,
then the conclusion follows that classic invasions, at the very least, are illegal.
Importantly, this reflects a more general pattern. It shows that international law
is biased towards preserving the status quo.204 A classic invasion upsets the
current order and is thus likely to be sanctioned.205 On the other hand, in the
case of interfering in a civil war or reinitiating hostilities in the midst of an
ongoing dispute, there is no stable status quo to disrupt. The legality of
superpowers maintaining their traditional spheres of influence through wars
that would otherwise be classified as classic invasions also makes sense in this
context. International terrorism promotes destruction and instability and,
therefore, limited strikes to deal with the problem are not sanctioned but rather
treated as legal uses of force. The major exception to the status quo bias of the
law regarding the interstate use of force since World War II has been cases
where third-parties support non-Europeans fighting to overthrow Western
powers or achieve equality with European-derived people, as in the case of the
international condemnation of the white regime in South Africa and the
sanctions put on the country for attacking anti-apartheid activists in
neighboring states.206 With the end of colonialism and legalized European
privilege, however, this anomaly of international law has become irrelevant.

203
204
205
206

See supra notes 88–94 and accompanying text.
For an earlier version of this argument, see WEISBURD, supra note 84, at 310–13.
Id. at 313.
Id.
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Even the international reactions to the four classic invasions between 1945
and 1991 that did not result in meaningful sanctions against the aggressor
support the theory of the status quo bias or can be explained by other rules of
international law. Iraq was not sanctioned for its invasion of Iran, and Tanzania
faced no significant consequences for its attack against Uganda.207 In both
situations, however, the target regime was itself a threat to international
stability.208 Self-determination, the same principle that legitimized struggles
against European colonialism and apartheid, explains the arguable legality of
Indonesia’s annexation of West Irian and India’s seizure of Goa.209
The analysis of humanitarian interventions and the international reactions
to them shows that they generally fit into the same pattern that other wars do.
Wars that preserve the status quo are more acceptable than both wars that
disrupt the status quo and wars that involve intervention in a situation where
there is little stability to begin with.210 Although Western countries sometimes
allow humanitarian concerns to overrule other important considerations, other
states like Russia and China tend to prefer maintaining international
stability.211 Somalia had no functioning government when the United Nations
intervened to deliver food aid;212 there was no way that the international
community could preserve a status quo that did not exist. Yugoslavia was in
the process of disintegrating when NATO attacked, but it was still a
universally recognized state.213 Therefore, the Kosovo intervention was greatly
resisted by much of the world.214 Finally, the African Union, Arab League,
China, and Russia were willing to support a no-fly zone over Libya that would
prevent Muammar Gadaffi from killing large numbers of civilians.215 As soon
as it became clear that NATO was trying to overthrow the government of an
established state, however, the war came to look more like a classic invasion

207

Id. at 40–42, 47–52.
Id. at 60–61.
209 Id. at 59–60.
210 Id. at 311.
211 See GLENNON, supra note 5, at 156–59.
212 See Jeffrey Gettleman & Neil MacFarquhar, Somalia Food Aid Bypasses Needy, U.N. Study Says, N.Y.
TIMES, March 7, 2010, at A1.
213 Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Rejects Demand for Cessation of Use of Force
Against Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, U.N. Press Release SC/6659 (Mar. 26, 1999).
214 Id.
215 Arab States Back Libya No-Fly Zone Against Gaddafi, REUTERS, (Mar. 12, 2011), http://www.reuters.
com/article/2011/03/12/us-libya-idUSTRE7270JP20110312; see also S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1973
(Mar. 17, 2011).
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and the international community soured on the attack.216 The leading states of
NATO may be too powerful to suffer economic sanctions or military invasion
as a result of the international community’s anger, but expanding the mission
in Libya has made it harder for the United States and its allies to effectively
pressure the al-Assad regime in Syria to give up the struggle against its own
domestic uprising and may have other future consequences.217
Finally, understanding the status quo bias sheds light on the territorial
integrity norm. For what can be more destabilizing to the international
community than a redrawing of accepted borders? Throughout history,
territorial disputes have been the main cause of war.218 If the international
community regards well-established borders as inviolable and states are
sanctioned for trying to annex territory, then even countries predisposed to go
to war will have much less to fight about. The result has been the end of
territory wars and the near-elimination of states using their militaries to
overthrow other sovereign governments.219
G. Should We Thank (or Blame) International Law?
There are several reasons why territorial aggression and classic invasions
may have become less common, some of which have nothing to do with
international law. First, over time, land has become less valuable relative to
“human capital,” thus reducing the incentives to make war to seize territory.220
Second, the bipolar world during the Cold War was important for maintaining
international stability.221 Third, the spread of democracy can also be
credited.222 These theories may be partly correct. However, these material or
structural explanations of the status quo bias fail to do fully describe the
decrease in war for several reasons. The international reaction to classic
216 Russia Reacts with “Regret” to Military Action in Libya, CNN (Mar. 19, 2011, 5:29 PM), http://
articles.cnn.com/2011-03-19/world/russia.libya_1_military-action-russian-foreign-ministry-internationalforce?_s=PM:WORLD; China Expresses Regret for Military Strike Against Libya, XINHUANET (Mar. 20,
2011), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-03/20/c_13788512.htm.
217 See Rick Gladstone, Friction at the U.N. as Russia and China Veto Another Resolution on Syria
Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2012, at A8.
218 Zacher, supra note 97, at 215–16.
219 Id. at 234.
220 Id. at 243.
221 Mark R. Beissinger, Demise of an Empire-State: Identity, Legitimacy, and the Destruction of Soviet
Politics, in THE RISING TIDE OF CULTURAL PLURALISM: THE NATION-STATE AT BAY? 93, 94–95 (Crawford
Young ed., 1993); Yoo, supra note 188, at 653.
222 See PINKER, supra note 130, at 278–84.
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invasions indicates that there are severe sanctions for states that use force to
seize land or overthrow other governments.223 In domestic law, if an act is
prohibited by law with severe sanctions against those who violate the rule, then
many would agree with the presumption that the sanctions are at least partly
responsible for the undesirable act’s infrequent occurrence.224 Supporting this
position is the fact that since the end of the Cold War, the European Union, the
United States, and the United Nations have all become much more willing to
use sanctions to deal with human rights violations, nuclear proliferation, and
other international problems.225 This indicates that today the international
community would be at least as willing as it has been in the past to take
meaningful steps in response to interstate aggression.
There are several reasons why explanations of the status quo bias of
international law that ignore norms are inadequate. First, while it may be true
that land has become less important in determining national wealth, with
ownership of tangible resources, particularly oil, land can still make the
difference between a country being rich or poor. From 1988 to 1996, eleven
states had oil exports that had a total value that was higher than one quarter of
their entire GDP.226 In the same time period, no less than seventeen states had
oil exports that were valued at over ten percent of GDP, and six states had
exported non-fuel minerals that were valued at least ten percent of GDP.227
Also, since 1996 the price of oil has skyrocketed. Between 2000 and 2002, oil
was selling for between $17 and $40 a barrel.228 From the end of 2010 to the
summer of 2012, it was fluctuating between $68 and $110 a barrel.229 Thus, it
is possible that some states have become even more dependent on oil for their
wealth over the last decade.
Second, the theory that the bipolar world is responsible for the international
stability of the modern era also fails as a full explanation. Since the collapse of
the Berlin Wall, the status quo bias has continued to be as much of a factor as
223

See supra Part I.B.
See JACK P. GIBBS, CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND DETERRENCE 2–3, 11–13 (1975).
225 See Kimberly Ann Elliott, Trends in Economic Sanctions Policy: Challenges to the Conventional
Wisdom, in INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS: BETWEEN WORDS AND WARS IN THE GLOBAL SYSTEM 3, 3–6 (Peter
Wallensteen & Carina Staibano eds., 2005).
226 Michael L. Ross, Does Oil Hinder Democracy?, 53 WORLD POL. 325, 326 (2001).
227 Id. at 326–27. These figures do not take into account domestic resource consumption. Id.
228 See Crude Oil Spot Prices, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/
LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=RWTC&f=D (last visited Sept. 28, 2013).
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it was before in international law, and the disappearance of the Soviet Union
has not led to an upsurge of classic invasions. In fact, while the number of
interstate wars did see a slight jump after 1991, the total number of people
killed per interstate war has plummeted, meaning fewer overall deaths.230
Some have argued that it is actually a unipolar world that leads to stability and
credit American hegemony for international peace.231 But the norms favoring
territorial integrity and prohibiting classic invasions have persisted both during
and after the Cold War. This indicates that the international stability of the
modern era depends less on whether the world is unipolar or bipolar than it
does on other factors. Multipolarity, however, with three or more poles, has not
existed since at least 1945 and may be a system less conducive to peace.
Finally, there are problems with using the democratic peace theory to
explain the status quo bias of international law. In recent decades, the
territorial integrity norm has applied to dictatorial regimes as well as
democratic states, with no country having successfully annexed another’s
territory since 1976.232 In the last thirty-eight years, the rule has been observed
everywhere despite the presence of dictatorial regimes. The territorial integrity
norm is not exclusively observed between democracies or between
democracies and dictatorships. Non-democracies have followed the same norm
for nearly four decades usually without undertaking classic invasions against
one another.
While a few countries in the world like South Korea and Japan have
become wealthy mostly due to human capital, others like Qatar and Kuwait
have achieved a high standard of living by simply residing over a sea of oil. If
countries mostly sought security and power, then it seems it would make sense
to seize another state’s territory and profit off of its oil or other resources. Yet
arguably, the only national leader in the Middle East who has acted in a
manner consistent with the theory of states as self-interested actors has been
Saddam Hussein, and both he and his country suffered dire consequences as a
result.233 Even if it is not logical to invade other countries to seize their
resources, leaders do not have perfect information. In a Hobbesian system with
asymmetric information and cognitive biases, at least some countries should be
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PINKER, supra note 130, at 300–04.
See William C. Wohlforth, The Stability of a Unipolar World, INT’L SECURITY, Summer 1999, at 5.
Zacher, supra note 97, at 244.
See supra text accompanying notes 105–15.
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expected to weigh their options and come to the conclusion that a classic
invasion makes sense in a particular instance. The fact that no state does
indicates either that moral scruples on the part of leaders prevent them from
attacking other countries or that the international sanctions that come when one
launches a classic invasion are deterring such actions.
One could potentially argue against the obey-or-be sanctioned standard by
the saying that the behavior we observe simply shows states acting in their own
interests.234 State A might not invade the smaller state B because state C, the
largest state of all, has an interest in stopping state A.235 The rules of
international law will only be followed if they are consistent with an
equilibrium resulting from a system of international actors pursuing their own
interests, because there is no third-party enforcer.236 As soon as circumstances
change, states will not hesitate to violate the norms they once supported.
The universality of the territorial integrity norm indicates that there is more
going on than states simply trying to maximize wealth, security, and power.237
It has been more than three and a half decades since a state has successfully
seized the territory of another. In all that time, it seems quite implausible to
believe that the world’s more powerful states have never seen a single instance
where it was in their interest to support one state’s takeover of a part of
another. A critic of international law may point out that stability itself is what
powerful states might seek; therefore, the long term benefits of upholding the
norm against classic invasions might outweigh the short-term benefits of
supporting its violation in any particular instance.238
This theory of enforcement, however, is not an alternative to international
law but rather another way of describing it. If it were shown that the police or a
state’s leader only enforced the law for self-interested reasons, that would be
no reason to argue that domestic law did not exist. The more relevant question
is whether enforcers of the law consistently punish certain actions and
therefore deter what are considered crimes. Since classic invasions are

234

See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 3, at 28–29.
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236 Stephen D. Krasner, The Hole in the Whole: Sovereignty, Shared Sovereignty, and International Law,
25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1075, 1085–88 (2004).
237 See supra Part I.G.
238 See Yoo, supra note 11, at 791–93 (arguing that the hegemonic stability theory may explain why a
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consistently punished, it follows from both the U.N. Charter and the actual
state practice that these kinds of wars are illegal.
Perhaps the reason that international law is not given more credit for the
decline in interstate war is because the victory over classic invasions and
territorial aggrandizement has been so complete. In 1990, after the
international community succeeded in expelling Saddam Hussein from Kuwait,
there was a burst of optimism that, with the end of the Cold War, a “new world
order” had arrived that would finally provide collective security.239 Had a large
number of classic invasions occurred since, perhaps the collective response
would have been the same each time and more people would be optimistic
about the enforcement of contemporary norms relating to the use of force and
territorial integrity. But because this has not happened, and wars for territory
have been eliminated, it is very easy to take what has been accomplished for
granted. It is hard to believe that even the most optimistic global legalist alive
in 1945 actually thought that Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter was to be taken
literally. Similarly, the collective effort to eliminate interstate conflict should
be judged by more modest standards than one that demands the elimination of
all war, at least in the short term.
If the decline of interstate conflict is based on factors unrelated to
international law, perhaps there is little risk in tweaking the U.N. Charter or
introducing new ways to deal with the domestic use of force by states. But
before accepting the need for or desirability of reform, the current doctrine of
international law regarding the use of force must be acknowledged. That
doctrine may very well be responsible for the elimination of the kinds of
conflicts that originally motivated the study of international law and the
formation of the United Nations. In the postwar era, classic invasions have
been met with severe sanctions, and a territorial integrity norm has been
established and maintained.240 This indicates that among states, there is a
normative bias in favor of the status quo, and states are willing to act to
enforce this preference. Only by understanding the world community’s
reactions to past instances of interstate uses of force can we have more
informed discussions on the desirability of potential changes to the current
international order.

239 See Koh, supra note 15, at 2630; Anthony Clark Arend, The United Nations and the New World
Order, 81 GEO. L.J. 491, 491 (1993).
240 See infra Part II.C.
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II. WHAT DETERMINES WHICH NORMS ARE EFFECTIVE
This Part presents a more general theory of how a global norm can become
an effective part of international law. Having argued against material
explanations for the status quo bias of international law, the broader issues
surrounding global norms are examined here, including the questions of when
they are adhered to and why. First, no norm can exist without a “norm
entrepreneur,” which is often a powerful individual or group of sovereign
states that accepts the rule and pushes the rest of the world to accept it. Once
the norm has been created, whether it survives depends on its specificity and
how inherently morally compelling it is. When a norm gains a high enough
degree of legitimacy, its violation becomes unthinkable for most state actors.
The world community punishes rule-breakers, and the norm thus meets the
obey-or-be sanctioned standard of international law. Over time, not acting in
conformance with the rule becomes even more unthinkable. Even if states are
self-interested actors, if they behave as people do in the real world, they are not
completely rational agents seeking their own good. They are shaped by norms
and a desire to live up to standards of appropriateness; this Article argues that
at the very least, world leaders are subject to the same influences that affect
individuals.
The model presented explains why some norms take hold and some do not.
Three historical examples are chosen as illustrations of the larger point: the
decline of slavery, the end of colonization, and the campaign to establish a
guaranteed minimum standard of living under international law. The goal is to
avoid biasing the analysis by only discussing norms that took hold. While
slavery is universally condemned and rarely practiced and colonization is
similarly unthinkable, there is still no global consensus on issues regarding
wealth redistribution. While just about every state able to do so provides some
kind of social safety net, states do not try to force other countries to accept
expansive welfare states, and in domestic politics, no one relies on
international law to make the case for redistributionist policies. Examining the
norms that have succeeded shows that materialistic accounts are incapable of
explaining the creation and maintenance of the rules banning slavery and
colonization.
Finally, a similar analysis is conducted regarding the two main legs of the
status quo bias of international law: the territorial integrity norm and the ban
on classic invasions. These norms have succeeded while others have failed
because of the path-dependent course of international law and the fact that
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these norms are clear and morally compelling. The moral correctness of the
ban on classic invasions can be quibbled with despite the ban’s effectiveness.
The parameters of this rule are also uncertain. The territorial integrity norm
works even better as an effective rule of international law and, consistent with
the theory presented, has even more influence on state behavior.
A. Why Do Some Norms Succeed?
International norms have been defined as rules of state practice that are
followed out of a sense of “oughtness” or because the rules are legitimized in
the minds of relevant actors.241 This is similar to the concept of customary
international law, with its corresponding requirements of state practice and
opinio juris.242 To realist scholars, norms are about power; states follow them
when convenient and then adjust their behavior as the international situation
changes.243 For example, powerful states have always forced weaker ones to
protect certain minorities out of ideational concerns.244 However, it is argued
that those who believe that international law can trump national interests have
failed to show that there is a mechanism that makes leaders follow the
unenforceable rules of the world community.245
Some international relations scholars, in contrast, believe that norms
occasionally have explanatory power in and of themselves.246 A few of these
scholars have tried to explain why some norms become prominent and others
do not, and why leaders would follow rules of the international system when
doing so harms the national interest. For example, Ann Florini makes an
analogy between the success or failure of a norm in the international system
and the fate of a genetic trait in a biological population.247 Three factors
determine whether a variation of a gene proliferates, goes extinct, or coexists
with other alleles in a state of equilibrium—these factors are what she calls
prominence, coherence, and environment.248 Prominence means that the gene
must first establish a “foothold” in the population. The mutation must arise and
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Ann Florini, The Evolution of International Norms, 40 INT’L STUD. Q. 363, 364–65 (1996).
See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
See Krasner, supra note 27, at 266.
See STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 73–104 (1999).
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have a chance for success.249 A bird born with unusually sharp vision will not
have the chance to pass on its advantageous trait if it is killed soon after being
born. Coherence depends on the other genes carried by an organism.250 One
needs both sharp teeth and a suitable digestive system to eat meat; one trait
without the other is much less useful. The environment is everything external
to the actor, and the factor that is usually most heavily emphasized in accounts
of natural selection.251
All three factors have their equivalents in the study of the survival of
norms. A rule must first become prominent due to the efforts of a “norm
entrepreneur,” which can be a powerful state or nongovernmental
organizations.252 Once established, for a new norm to survive, it must be
coherent with older rules.253 If it contradicts other practices widely accepted by
the international community, the norm is less likely to succeed. Finally, the
“environment” the international norm finds itself in depends on everything that
goes on in the global system.254 This includes the international balance of
power and technological developments over time.
Vaughn Shannon presents a slightly different model, which takes norms as
a given and tries to explain why a state would follow an unenforceable rule
when it conflicts with the national interest.255 He points to important findings
from political psychology that can shed light on compliance. Perhaps the most
important of these is that people, presumably including world leaders, try to
maintain positive self-images and gain approval and esteem from their peers.256
The need for a positive self-image “has been characterized as being among the
strongest and most persistent of human goals” and has been shown to exist
even “in the absence of external sanctioning agents.”257 The need to be
accepted by peers means that individuals are prone to making use of the
acceptability heuristic, which is a finding that people are biased towards acting
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Id. at 376.
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Violation, 44 INT’L STUD. Q. 293, 299–300 (2000).
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in ways that their relevant social community considers acceptable.258 This
means that a president or prime minister does not exist in a vacuum. The leader
is rather a social being with psychological needs, belonging to a certain
“identity group” whose approval he seeks.259 What is considered normal or
acceptable exerts a normative pull on his psyche that sometimes comes into
conflict with more easily quantifiable economic desires. Today, it is reasonable
to believe that world leaders see elites of other states as part of their peer
group.260
Shannon, like other constructivist scholars, also makes use of the
psychological concept of the omission bias, which teaches that people prefer
acting in accordance with the status quo, all else being equal.261 The presence
of the omission bias is ubiquitous in the creation of legal systems. For
example, pharmaceutical companies are punished for harmful effects of
vaccinations but not for failing to create vaccines.262 Many jurisdictions
similarly impose no duty to help even when the costs of doing so are greatly
outweighed by the harm prevented.263 People are often hesitant to pull the plug
on life-saving medical care even if they would decline to initiate such care
under identical circumstances.264 Due to the omission bias, a norm created by
powerful states might occasionally be expected to stick, even if there is nothing
inherently compelling about it.
Shannon’s model of compliance—relying on the acceptability heuristic, the
omission bias, and the fact that leaders seek approval from themselves and
others—takes conformance with the rules of the international community as
the norm.265 From the perspective of political psychology, the question is not
“why do states obey international law?” but “why do states break well
accepted rules?”
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For the issue of whether to comply to come up, there must first be a
conflict between traditional interests and adherence to the rule in question. If
there is, then we ask how interpretable, or “fuzzy,” the norm is. If the rule is
extremely clear—everyone agrees it is wrong to do X and what constitutes X is
not in dispute, particularly in this situation—then violation becomes very
difficult. On the other hand, if a particular situation arguably fits into an
exception, then the actor may be able to justify violating the norm in question
to himself and his peers. Finally, even if the situation clearly does not fall into
an exception to the rule, if incentives to violate are high enough and the state
can get away with breaking the rule through covert means, a leader may still
act in opposition to the norm.
Behavioral research has confirmed the importance of both the “fuzziness”
of a rule and maintaining a positive self-image in our daily lives.266 Most
people like to think of themselves as honest, regardless of whether anyone else
is looking.267 In summing up a series of experiments where individuals had the
opportunity to cheat others while believing that no one would find out,
Jonathan Haidt explained: “People [did not] try to get away with as much as
they could. Rather . . . they cheated only up to the point where they themselves
could no longer find a justification that would preserve their belief in their own
honesty.”268 In one case, students participated in an experiment in which they
were told that they had earned $6.25.269 When they went to receive their
payment, the cashier purposefully made a mistake by giving them two extra
dollars.270 Some students were simply given the extra money, but in a different
run of the experiment, the cashier asked, “Is that right?” after counting the
cash.271 The prompt made all the difference. In the baseline experiment of 120
students, only twenty students pointed out the mistake compared to sixty who
did so when asked if they had received the correct amount.272
Other studies also support the view that human beings are neither
completely honest nor ruthless self-interest maximizers. In one experiment,
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subjects were given a fifty question multiple-choice exam and were told that
they would be awarded ten cents for every correct answer.273 After answering
the questions, a control group transferred their answers to a blank scoring
sheet.274 The control group answered an average of 32.6 questions correctly.275
Another group of students transferred their answers to a scoring sheet with the
correct answers already marked.276 This group claimed to have answered, on
average, 36.2 questions correctly.277 Interestingly, they did not act as rational
choice actors and report no errors, but simply chose to give themselves a small
bump.278 This was not due to the students being afraid of getting caught,
because it made no difference in reporting their scores on whether they could
shred their answer sheets after the experiment.279 It can easily be seen how the
participants could have believed that they were acting honestly while also,
giving themselves the benefit of the doubt in ambiguous cases.
This supports the idea that states would have a preference for behaving in
accordance with widely accepted norms, even if leaders only had to answer to
their own consciences. Yet, some norm violations, such as invading another
state, occur in clear view of the rest of the world. The aggressor suffers
psychological disutility from knowing that it behaved inappropriately and also
from reputational damage. Even when no one is watching, people only behave
dishonestly to the extent to which one can maintain a positive self-image.
When reputation comes into play, the incentives for behaving in accordance
with widely-accepted norms are even stronger.
Florini and Shannon are asking two separate but related questions. Florini’s
evolutionary analogy seeks to help us predict whether a norm will become
universal, die out, or like certain genes, come to exist in a state of equilibrium
with some states acting in conformance and others behaving in a contrary
manner.280 Shannon’s model works on a case-by-case basis. Instead of asking
whether the norm will succeed, it takes the norm as given and addresses the
question of “is state X likely to conform with the norm in this particular
273
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instance?”281 The two inquiries are similar because the survival of a norm
depends on whether states behave in accordance with it.282 If they ignore the
rule often enough, it is no longer a norm.
How an Effective Norm Develops
Is there a norm entrepreneur?


Yes
No

Is the norm
Norm not established
inherently likely to
succeed?


No
Yes

Ι
Success or failure comes to depend on
Ι
“environment”: balance of power, technological
Ι
development, etc.

More states begin to follow norm −−Norm gains increasing legitimacy

Ι
Ι
Ι
Ι
Ι
Ι
Ι
Ι
Ι
Ι

−−−−−−




Violation begins to seem “unthinkable” to
Ι
most states
Ι

Ι
Rare violators signal that they are outside
Ι
the circle of consideration of the
Ι
international community and are heavily
Ι
sanctioned
Ι

Ι

Ι
Norm becomes part of international
−−
law under obey-or-be sanctioned standard

281 See Shannon, supra note 255, at 305–10 (discussing the American invasion of Panama, which
contradicted the international norm of noninterventionism).
282 Florini’s concept of “environment” is too broad for our purposes here. While it is true that balance of
power considerations and technological developments affect the ultimate fate of norms, as they do just about
everything else, focusing on these facts does not help us predict from an ex ante perspective how likely a norm
is to succeed. The tools of international relations do not allow us to forecast future changes in culture and
technology. On the other hand, no historical study of the development of an international rule would be
complete without considering such factors. In this model, most of the emphasis is placed on the qualities of
norms themselves, even though the spread of ideas must depend to some degree on the state of technology and
the international distribution of power.
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Instead of taking norms as a given, the model presented here explains both
their origins and how much each particular rule can be expected to influence
state behavior in individual circumstances. Much of the work is done by
determining a norm’s “robustness.” If a norm has the inherent qualities that
make it likely to influence state behavior in particular circumstances, it can,
from an ex ante perspective, be expected to “stick.” Over time, if the norm is
followed often enough, it becomes more and more legitimized in the minds of
the actors of the world community.
In the model presented, a rule is established through the actions of a norm
entrepreneur. Many norms owe their existence to a powerful state—or
sometimes a coalition of states—coming to believe that it has an interest in
encouraging or suppressing a certain kind of activity. The worldwide abolition
of the slave trade by the British is a prominent example.283 Similarly, after each
world war, the United States played a unique role in shaping the League of
Nations and the United Nations.284 In the modern era, much of what can be
called norm creation has originated with NGOs and international
institutions.285 Regardless, the degree to which a new rule gains a “footing”
among the world community depends to a large extent on the power of the
initial norm entrepreneur and its zeal in enforcing the standard it sets.286 NGOs
and multi-national corporations are generally less likely than strong states to
create effective norms.
The reasons the original actor has for enforcing a norm may be economic,
ideational, or some combination of both. The power of the norm entrepreneur
and how committed it is to the new international rule will affect the likelihood
that the norm sticks. A state may be anti-slavery but do little to stem the
practice or, like the British in the nineteenth century, it can actively suppress
it.287 The United States cared enough about world peace after World War II to
push for the U.N. Charter, which became the authoritative legal text on the
interstate use of force.288 Article 2(4) and related provisions became Schelling
Points around which all future discussions of war and peace would be
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focused.289 Thus, a certain path-dependency was created regarding
international law and the use of force after World War II.
After a norm has been created, two factors will influence its potential for
affecting the consciences of world leaders and mass publics and becoming a
point around which coalesce future discussion and thinking regarding the
issues the rule pertains to. First, the more specific a norm is, the more likely it
is to be effective.290 This depends on how precisely the norm is defined and,
relatedly, how well it is understood.291 How many “exceptions” are there to the
rule, and how much time can countries spend debating whether the exception
applies in any individual case? Can a leader violate the norm and still be able
to convince the world community that he was actually behaving in a way
appropriate for a modern statesman? Once the relevant borders have been
established for a long period of time, the concept of the ban on aggressive war
is ambiguous in a way that the territorial integrity norm is not.292
Second, a norm will be more effective the more morally compelling it is.
The most cursory examination of world cultures would seem to cast doubt on
the proposition that there can be universal moral precepts that the entire world
can agree.293 Anthropologists who have taken a closer look, however, have
found many societal traits, including certain moral ideas about right and
wrong, to be universal across cultures.294 In the modern era, there is a world
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consensus on a handful of moral debates. Few today defend slavery, piracy, or
racial apartheid.295
Constructivists have emphasized that “cosmopolitan” values have a
competitive edge in the market place of ideas.296 And once individuals assent
to a principle such as self-determination or human equality, then other
positions logically follow. This is consistent with the concept of “coherence,”
which precludes norms that blatantly contradict one another.297
Philosopher Peter Singer writes of the “escalator of reason” and how it
provides a mechanism through which humans who share only their ability to
think logically can arrive at common ideas about morality 298 Human beings
evolved intelligence to help us survive, find mates, and reproduce, not to be
moral.299 Yet the interesting thing about the tool of reason is that it can take us
places we did not expect to go. Singer tells the story of Thomas Hobbes one
day glancing at the Forty-seventh Theorem of Euclid’s The Elements of
Geometry.300 Hobbes found what he read impossible to believe, until he
examined the entire chain of reasoning and was unable to dispute a single
point.301 Singer argues that the process of thinking about moral issues works in
the same way.
[B]y thinking about my place in the world, I am able to see that I am
just one being among others, with interests and desires like others. I
have a personal perspective on the world, from which my interests
are at the front and centre of the stage, the interests of my family and
friends are close behind, and the interests of strangers are pushed to
the back and sides. But reason enables me to see that others have
similarly subjective perspectives, and that from ‘the point of view of
302
the universe’ my perspective is no more privileged than theirs.

In fact, realists do not deny the effect of morality on human behavior. For
national leaders to act in the interests of their country in the first place, they
must not behave as self-interested agents in the public choice sense. Instead, a
295

See infra Part II.B.
See Chaim D. Kaufmann & Robert A. Pape, Explaining Costly International Moral Action: Britain’s
Sixty-Year Campaign Against the Atlantic Slave Trade, 53 INT’L ORG. 631, 642 (1999).
297 See supra notes 264–72 and accompanying text.
298 PETER SINGER, HOW ARE WE TO LIVE? 225–26 (1995).
299 Id.
300 Id. at 226.
301 Id.
302 Id. at 229.
296
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certain amount of altruism towards their fellow co-nationals is required.303
Thus, to a certain extent constructivists and realists only disagree about which
moral code leaders adopt. There is no self-evident reason why we should begin
with a model that says states act in their national interests. This Part argues that
different moral considerations explain the effectiveness of international norms.
Many constructivists do not simply assume that world leaders are equally
likely to hold all plausible normative preferences but go a step further. They
often follow realists in adopting the states-as-rational actors model to
formulate a null hypothesis.304 From there, they only consider nonrealist
explanations after showing that national interests as traditionally conceived
cannot explain certain changes in the external behavior of a state.305 As we will
see, certain case studies have persuasively shown that—at least when
discussing Western states—some of the biggest changes of the last few
centuries in how countries interact with one another cannot be explained by
considerations of power, economic interest, or national security. Ideational
concerns about right and wrong have mattered greatly.306
There is some relation between the path-dependency requirement and the
degree of specificity and inherent moral appeal of a norm. A norm might
become popular in a powerful state because of its moral coherence. This state
and its allies begin forming international institutions that aspire to propagate
and enforce the norm, and the rest of the world community accepts it partly for
the same reasons it initially became a successful cause in the original country.
This is what happened in the case of slavery; abolitionists within Great Britain
opposed the practice, and the greater public eventually compelled the
government to make abolition a goal of its foreign policy.307 Britain at first had
to use force to implement this preference, but after a long enough time,

303 See Stephen M. Walt, Nationalism Rules, FOREIGN POL’Y (July 15, 2011), http://www.foreignpolicy.
com/articles/2011/07/15/the_enduring_power_of_nationalism (on the connection between nationalism and
realism) (last visited Sept. 28, 2013).
304 Id.
305 See Judith Goldstein & Robert O. Keohane, Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework, in
IDEAS & FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 27, at 3, 6 (“We demonstrate [the] need to go beyond pure rationalist
analysis by using its own premise to generate our null hypothesis: that variation in policy across countries, or
over time, is entirely accounted for by changes in factors other than ideas.”).
306 See SINGER, supra note 298, at 223.
307 See, e.g., NETA C. CRAWFORD, ARGUMENT AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS: ETHICS,
DECOLONIZATION, AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 177 (2002); James Lee Ray, The Abolition of Slavery
and the End of International War, 43 INT’L ORG. 405, 412–13 (1989).
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practically every state agreed that slavery was wrong.308 Similarly, after the
Union won the American Civil War, slavery’s legal status was settled in the
United States.309
The danger of constructing theories based on moral appeal is that such
theories may simply assume that whatever the current culture believes in is the
morally correct position. Many Westerners might feel very strongly that gays
have a right to marry or that there must be a minimum wage. Yet people of
intelligence and good faith can disagree with these positions for very coherent
reasons. Few would say the same about the view that invading a neighboring
state and enslaving its population is immoral. Thus, a cause that has low
“inherent moral appeal” is simply a position regarding which, relative to other
norms examined in this Part, there is much more room for debate. Therefore,
the right to a decent standard of living, government-mandated restrictions on
the working day, and the right to unionize can be said to have low moral
appeal.310 This is because opposite positions can be taken on natural law or
utilitarian grounds.311
If a norm is widely followed because it is specific and morally compelling,
then more and more states will fall into line. The process is dynamic; the less
often the rule is broken, the more marked are violations. At this point, when a
state is tempted to violate the norm, it not only must overcome the desire to
conform with a rule that has inherent normative pull. It also must deal with the
fact that the norm has been legitimized by the behavior of much of the rest of
the international community.
Finally, the model presented here explains not only why norms are
followed, but how the international community can overcome the collective
action problem of punishing those that violate the rule. Perhaps not all leaders
can be expected to internalize the rules of international law such as the ban on
classic invasions. And while reciprocity works in a model with two agents

308

See SINGER, supra note 298, at 223.
Ray, supra note 307, at 413. Today, a not insignificant number of Southerners still celebrate the “Lost
Cause,” but not even they defend slavery, instead claiming that the Civil War was actually about the more
morally palatable concerns of self-government and states’ rights. See Edward T. Linenthal, The Contested
Landscape of American Memorialization: Levinson’s Written in Stone, 25 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 249, 253 (2000)
(book review).
310 See infra Part II.B.3.
311 See, e.g., DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST
PROGRESSIVE REFORM 109 (2011).
309
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repeatedly trying to overcome a collective action problem, game theory
instructs that in larger groups it is usually not in an individual’s interest to be
the one who sanctions those who violate norms.312 A punisher incurs the costs
of sanctioning another individual yet only receives a fraction of the benefit.313
A rational-choice agent should therefore hope that someone else punishes a
cheater or slacker so the agent can receive the benefits of the deterrent effect
through free-riding.
Contrary to theory, however, people do punish cheaters, or those they see
as behaving unfairly. Punishment itself is not inconsistent with rationalism, as
rational choice models would predict that people would be inclined to sanction
others when the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs for the punisher. But
individuals go further than that, punishing when there is nothing to gain, and
even when they must pay to do so.314 For instance, in one oft-repeated
experiment, one of two participants is given a certain amount of money and
instructed to offer a portion of it to his partner.315 If the partner accepts, the
transaction goes through, while if the offer is rejected, neither player receives
anything.316 A rationalist account would expect the first player to make the
smallest offer possible, and the second to accept it. The recipient knows that
something is better than nothing, and the allocator should know that the
recipient knows that something is better than nothing. In fact, in the original
experiment, the first party on average offered the second party over thirty
percent of the total pot.317 Recipients did not accept any nonzero sum but
instead rejected nearly a quarter of all offers.318 They were willing to give up a
small reward so that the party that angered them would be forced to forgo a
larger prize.
In another experiment, each of four players on a team was given twenty
tokens worth about ten cents each.319 The players were then told that they
could choose how much to put into a common pot.320 The number of tokens
312 James H. Fowler, Altruistic Punishment and the Origin of Cooperation, 102 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI.
7047, 7047 (2005); see also supra notes text accompanying notes 13‒16.
313 Id. at 7049.
314 Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Ultimatum Game, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 195, 197 (1988).
315 Id. at 196–97.
316 Id. at 196.
317 Id. at 197.
318 Id.
319 See HAIDT, supra note 267, at 178.
320 Id.

HANANIA GALLEYSPROOFS

2013]

NORMS GOVERNING THE INTERSTATE USE OF FORCE

4/14/2014 10:24 AM

881

put into the pot was then multiplied by 1.6, and the new total was divided
between the players.321 In the next round, the teams were scrambled so that no
norms of cooperation could develop within groups.322 The rational strategy
then was to never contribute anything and hope that all the other players had
contributed a lot. People, however, began the game by contributing an average
of about ten tokens.323 But after six rounds, the more generous players had
tired of being burned, and participants were only contributing six tokens
each.324
At that point players were told that the experiment would continue as
before, with only one change.325 After learning how much each partner put into
the common pool, they would have the option of punishing those who did not
contribute their fair share.326 For every one token a player who was willing to
pay, three would be taken away from the cheater.327 Over the course of the
experiment, eighty-four percent of players chose to punish someone at least
once, and as a result, cooperation skyrocketed.328 Players were contributing
fifteen tokens each by the twelfth round.329 For a rational actor, the new
conditions should not have made a difference. If I punish a cheater, that may
make him think twice about not contributing his fair share in the next round.
But that does me little good because the experiment was designed so that I
could expect to be playing with different agents from then on. The purely
rational strategy stayed the same throughout the game: contribute nothing and
do not punish. These experiments are not anomalies, as it has been shown time
and time again in laboratory settings that people sanction others “even when
interactions are anonymous, there are no reputation effects, and the punisher is
a third-party who is unaffected by the free rider’s actions.”330
Like the experiments showing limited cheating with plausible deniability,
this research supports models that emphasize the importance of a positive selfimage. Most players began by trying to pull their fair share, instead of
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330

Id.
Id. at 179.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Fowler, supra note 312, at 7047.
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exclusively looking out for their own self-interest. This indicates that even if
world leaders could flout international law without consequences, and even if
they identified the national interest with their own, they may still incur costs in
order to conform with international norms. But carrying out a classic invasion
that clearly violates international law is something that happens transparently.
The norm violator declares its intentions to the world. Not only are there
negative reputational affects resulting from the aggression, but in enforcing
international law other states may be rewarded by reputational gains. If people
will sanction cheaters at a cost even when no one else can possibly know, it
follows that they are even more likely to do so, and less likely to cheat
themselves, when everyone is watching. If circumstances and the inherent
properties of the norm allow for it, a point comes when adherence to the rule is
nearly universal and violators are almost always punished. At this point, the
rule meets the obey-or-be sanctioned standard and can be considered part of
international law.
Rule violators may also be punished because when a state has behaved in a
way universally recognized as inappropriate, leaders of powerful states may be
better able to justify breaking the rule against classic invasions in attacking the
aggressor. Shannon points out that one may violate a norm against a group of
people when the “[t]argets are ‘exempt’ from moral consideration because they
are perceived to have directly threatened or injured the subject (self-defense) or
because they lie outside normative parameters by virtue of their status as a
socially unacceptable group (e.g., ‘terrorists’) . . . .”331 In other words, when a
state violates a well established norm, it may come to be seen as outside of the
group to which one applies the normal rules of international relations. At the
extreme, the outsider may invoke feelings of hatred and disgust.332 This
demonization, combined with the natural human urge to punish violators of
accepted norms, leads states to incur costs to sanction those who behave in
ways widely considered unacceptable.
This process is dynamic. The norm becoming part of international law
under the obey-or-be sanctioned standard increases its legitimacy. At a certain
point, those who violate the rule are seen as close to psychotic. After all, when
a norm is universally accepted and enforced, who would defy the entire planet
and unleash certain retribution on his state? The fact that the aggressive actor is

331
332

Shannon, supra note 255, at 303.
Id.
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so “irrational” adds to the case for opposing him. For instance, Saddam
Hussein’s reputation never recovered after the invasion of Kuwait, and this
was perhaps why he was unsuccessful in regaining any degree of international
acceptance over the course of the rest of his reign.333
In sum, a norm becomes established because it is pushed by a powerful
norm entrepreneur. If it has the qualities of an inherently compelling rule—
specificity and moral appeal—leaders will follow it to maintain a positive selfimage and a desirable reputation. Eventually, violation becomes unthinkable,
and states will punish the few remaining rule-breakers, even at a cost. This
only reinforces the normative pull of the norm, making compliance still more
likely even in cases where a state may not expect to be sanctioned for a
violation.
B. Case Studies
This Part provides three case studies to test the theory presented. To avoid
biasing the inquiry, this Part will review two norms that “stuck”—the abolition
of slavery and colonization—and one that has had much less success—the
right to a decent standard of living. In the process, this Part shows that the two
popular schools of analysis that tend to put more emphasis on material
considerations, rational choice and Marxism, fail to explain why slavery and
colonial rule ended when they did. In these cases, accounts stressing the power
of ideas have much greater explanatory force.334 Indeed, states were often
acting against their own interests when they took it upon themselves to
eliminate slavery and colonialism.335 However, a requirement that individuals
be guaranteed a decent standard of living has lacked a powerful norm
entrepreneur. The idea also falls short on measures of specificity and moral
appeal, unlike the causes of antislavery and anti-colonialism. Finally, I address
how well the model explains both parts of the status quo bias of international
law: the ban on classic invasions and the territorial integrity norm. Both parts
of the status quo bias are specific and morally compelling, although the model
presented predicts that the territorial integrity norm would be more robust than
the ban on classic invasions. That is exactly what we see.

333 See Kevin Woods et al., Saddam’s Delusions: The View from the Inside, FOREIGN AFF., May–June
2006, at 2‒26.
334 See, e.g., Ray, supra note 307, at 415.
335 Id.
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1. The British Outlaw Slavery
Slavery had been an unquestioned part of virtually every developed
civilization.336 With the beginnings of colonialism and the Industrial
Revolution, however, it came to be practiced on a previously unimaginable
scale.337 The international slave trade reached its peak in the last decades of the
eighteenth century.338 During the 1790s, over 750,000 slaves were shipped to
the West Indies, the United States, and Brazil.339 From 1791 to 1805, British
ships carried fifty-two percent of the slaves shipped overseas, and partly as a
result, British colonies produced fifty-five percent of the world’s sugar
between 1805 and 1806.340 The country’s shares of both the slave and sugar
trades were rising at this time.341
In 1807, however, Great Britain officially ended its participation in the
slave trade, becoming only the third country to do so.342 It made slave trading a
capital offense seventeen years later.343 In 1833, Britain became the first state
to free its slaves.344 It was not content to simply do away with the practice
domestically, however. Until 1867, the state took it upon itself to use its global
naval hegemony to end the slave trade all over the world, employing a mix of
bribery and coercion against uncooperative governments.345 Great Britain’s
efforts are credited with ending close to eighty percent of the international
traffic of human beings.346 According to one estimate, the Royal Navy freed
nearly 150,000 slaves between 1810 and 1864.347 In the second half of the
1800s, Brazil and Cuba became two of the last major slave importers in the
Western hemisphere to ban the import of slaves.348 By the twentieth century,
there was no thriving international slave trade, and the scale was much lower

336

See id. at 407.
Kaufmann & Pape, supra note 296, at 634.
338 See id.
339 Id.
340 See id.
341 Id.
342 LESLIE BETHELL, THE ABOLITION OF THE BRAZILIAN SLAVE TRADE: BRITAIN, BRAZIL, AND THE SLAVE
TRADE QUESTION 1807–1869, at ix (1970); Ray, supra note 307, at 409.
343 CRAWFORD, supra note 307, at 184.
344 Kaufmann & Pape, supra note 296, at 634; Ray, supra note 307, at 409.
345 Kaufmann & Pape, supra note 296, at 634.
346 Id.
347 CRAWFORD, supra note 307, at 186 n.111 (citing DAVID ELTIS, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE ENDING
OF THE TRANSATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE, 97–98 (1987)).
348 See Kaufmann & Pape, supra note 296, at 634.
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than it had been before the British’s efforts in the nineteenth century. Today,
the prevalence of slavery in the world is near zero.349
Britain’s campaign to end the slave trade from 1807 to 1867 was “the most
expensive international moral effort in modern world history, with most of the
cost paid by one country.”350 This poses obvious problems for realism, since
Britain dominated the slave trade but expended blood and treasure over an
extended period of time to win the freedom of strangers. About 5000 British
lives were lost suppressing the slave trade.351 Between 1807 and 1842, British
West Indian sugar production declined by almost twenty-five percent while
competitor states that relied on slavery saw a 210 percent increase.352 In 1805,
Britain produced fifty-five percent of the world’s sugar; by 1850, that number
was down to fifteen percent.353 According to one estimate, the anti-slavery
campaign cost Britain nearly two percent of its national income between 1808
and 1867.354 The economic costs impacted all classes and were well
understood by the general public.355
Both free market thinkers and Marxists have maintained that the growth
and decline of slavery could be explained by economics.356 Adam Smith
argued that forced labor was inefficient, because the slave had no rational
incentive to work hard.357 He predicted that owners would come to see that the
production of slaves was not worth the costs of feeding and housing them.358
Thus, the decisions of slaveholders and a free market would eventually replace
slavery with paid labor.359 Marxists similarly argue that slavery ended when
wage labor objectively became more profitable for the exploiting class.360
These materialistic explanations, however, have not stood up to empirical
scrutiny. While there was a time when scholars argued British sugar

349

Id. at 633.
Id. at 632–33.
351 Id. at 635 (citations omitted).
352 Id. at 636.
353 Id.
354 Id. at 636–37.
355 Id. at 636, 639–40.
356 See Ray, supra note 307, at 409 (citing Richard K. Ashley, Three Modes of Economism, 27 INT’L
STUD. Q., 463 (1983)).
357 ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS 63 (Modern Library 1937) (1776).
358 Id. (citing DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN WESTERN CULTURE 434 (1966)).
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production was in decline and that emancipation served Britain’s national
interests, these views are no longer taken seriously.361 If slavery ended when it
was no longer profitable, then it is reasonable to believe that it would have
ended when owners voluntarily emancipated their slaves. In fact, all over the
world, the opposite happened, with slaveholders clinging to the institution as
long as possible, as in the American Civil War.362 Subsequent economic
analysis proved that they were rational to do so; Britain suffered great
economic losses as a result of abolition. Evidence from the United States also
contradicts the idea that slavery ended because it ceased being efficient. In the
run-up to the Civil War, per capita income in the American South was growing
thirty percent faster than it was in the North.363 Capitalists in the rest of the
country benefited from trade with the slaveholding states.364 Thus, nothing
indicates that there was ever anything inherent to the economics of slavery that
would have eventually led to its abolition.
The prohibition against slavery has been codified in several international
law documents. The Brussels Conference Act of 1890 sought to “prevent the
capture of slaves and intercept the routes of the slave trade.”365 The 1926
Slavery Convention called on all signatories “[t]o bring about, progressively
and as soon as possible, the complete abolition of slavery in all its forms.”366
The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights has a similar clause.367 In
1981, Mauritania became the last country to abolish slavery, although arguably
the practice has not actually been eradicated there yet.368
Slavery still exists, but not as an accepted practice. Just as there are killers
and rapists but no one who actually defends murder or rape, there are
slaveholders but no one who defends slavery. Even in Mauritania, the practice
361 PINKER, supra note 130, at 155 (“Most historians have concluded that Britain’s policing of the
abolition of slavery was driven by humanitarian motives.”); Kaufmann & Pape, supra note 296, at 636 n.11
(calling such views “discredited”); see also Ray, supra note 307, at 407–17.
362 Ray, supra note 307, at 411–15.
363 Id. at 414 n.41 (quoting ROBERT WILLIAM FOGEL & STANLEY L. ENGERMAN, TIME ON THE CROSS: THE
ECONOMICS OF AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY 251 (1974)).
364 Id. at 413.
365 General Act for the Repression of the African Slave Trade art. 2, July 2, 1890, 27 Stat. 886.
366 Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery art. 2, Sept. 25, 1926, 46 Stat. 2183, 60 U.N.T.S.
253.
367 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(III) A, art. 4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec.
10, 1948).
368 A. Yasmine Rassam, International Law and Contemporary Forms of Slavery: An Economic and Social
Rights-Based Approach, 23 PENN. ST. INT’L L. REV. 809, 818–19 (2005).
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continues because slaves often do not try to run away.369 This has led some to
argue that what is called “slavery” by modern activists and NGOs is usually
something closer to a caste system or economic relationships involving major
power asymmetries.370
The case of abolition fits into the model presented above. The “norm
entrepreneur” can be considered British antislavery advocates or the British
government. Great Britain was willing to incur the costs of creating an
antislavery norm once public sentiment was overwhelmingly in favor of
abolition. In 1787, the Committee for the Abolition of the Slave Trade was
formed in Great Britain.371 Abolitionists sent 519 antislavery petitions with
400,000 signatures to the House of Commons in 1792 alone.372 No issue had
ever before generated a larger number of petitions over the course of one
year.373 Rather than rely on economic arguments, these documents focused on
the inhumanity of the slave trade.374 In 1814, Parliament received 800 petitions
with one million signatures demanding that the British government encourage
France to give up the slave trade.375 The public pressure continued to grow
after Britain itself stopped trafficking in human beings. In early 1833, the year
of the Emancipation Act, Parliament received over 5000 anti-slavery
petitions.376 In addition to petitioning their elected representatives, abolitionists
used economic pressure to make forced labor less profitable, with activists
organizing boycotts against sugar made with slave labor in the early 1790s and
again in the late 1820s.377
The success of abolitionism in Britain and its eventual acceptance by
international law are both due to the fact that a rule against slavery has the
characteristics of a robust norm. The idea that human beings could not own
one another is a simple one. Precise dates can be ascertained for when

369 See id. at 819 (“[L]ittle to no violence is required to keep the slaves from leaving . . .
because . . . economic alternatives to slavery simply do not exist.”).
370 See Pieter Tesch, It’s Wrong to Claim that Slavery Still Exists in Mauritania, GUARDIAN, Sept. 6,
2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/sep/06/mauritania-eradicate-hangover-slavery-pietertesch.
371 CRAWFORD, supra note 307, at 177.
372 Id.
373 Id. at 177–78.
374 Id. at 178.
375 Id. at 184.
376 Id. at 182.
377 Id. at 178.
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countries abolished slavery without quibbling over what institutions do or do
not count. The 1926 Slavery Convention calls slavery “the status or condition
of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of
ownership are exercised.”378 This “remains the agreed upon definition of
slavery in international law.”379 There may be other forms of exploitation, but
they are not the same as the system of forced labor that ceased to exist in all
developed countries over the course of the nineteenth century.
The case for abolition is also morally clear.380 As soon as the
Enlightenment was under way and individuals were expected to defend
practices with reason, people quickly realized that slavery was unquestionably
immoral. The moral foundations of forced labor were attacked by
Enlightenment thinkers such as John Locke and Jacques-Pierre Brisson.381 The
cause of abolition in Britain picked up steam rapidly, as reflected in the
number of petitions sent to Parliament over the years and the response by the
government. But the time period is also marked for the inability of pro-slavery
forces to make an acceptable moral case for their position. They relied on
biblical arguments or claimed that abolition would harm British economic or
national security interests.382 Elsewhere, particularly in the United States, some
argued that Africans were naturally fit only to be slaves.383 This moral case
relies on the best interests of the slaves but was easily refuted by the logic that
lesser ability should not exclude one from the social contract. In addition, the
fact that slaves celebrated abolition, rather than mourning its passing,
discredited the paternalistic argument.384
It is true that not all countries agreed that slavery was wrong when the
moral case was presented to them, as entrenched interests and old ways of
thinking were still very powerful.385 This is why British enforcement and the
Civil War were necessary.386 But once the interests protecting slavery had been

378

Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery art. 1, para. 1., supra note 366.
Jean Allain, Definition of Slavery in International Law, 52 HOWARD L.J. 239, 240 (2009).
380 It has been implied by some that “wage slavery” under capitalism is not much different from forced
labor. See NOAM CHOMSKY, LANGUAGE AND POLITICS 44 (C.P. Otero ed., 2004). Tellingly, those few who
make this argument still believe that abolition was a moral step forward.
381 PINKER, supra note 130, at 155.
382 See CRAWFORD, supra note 307, at 175–76, 180–81.
383 Cf. PINKER, supra note 130, at 155.
384 See Jim Chen, Mayteenth, 89 MINN. L. REV. 203, 208–09 (discussing the origins of Juneteenth).
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destroyed, the practice did not reemerge in those countries that had abolished
it, except in the case of France, which abolished slavery in 1794 and
reinstituted it eight years later in some colonies.387 Established interests may
block moral reform, but without anyone directly benefiting from a practice
universally considered morally abhorrent, once banned it does not reemerge.
2. Postwar Decolonization
Colonialism has been defined as one government physically occupying and
controlling the land of another people for the benefit of the occupying state.388
Like slavery, it had been a near human universal for all of recorded history.389
Also, as in the case of slavery, European states in the early modern era took the
practice to new heights.390 At the end of World War II, Great Britain controlled
land that today consists of more than two-dozen countries, including the areas
in the modern states of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Jordan, Malaysia,
Myanmar, and Nigeria.391 At the same time, France either ruled over or was a
protectorate of Vietnam, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and a handful of modern
states in sub-Saharan Africa.392 Part of the Congo was under the control of
Belgium,393 and the Netherlands ruled Indonesia.394 Other European states had
less significant colonial holdings.395
Yet after World War II, each of these empires crumbled. This process
started immediately after the war, as India gained independence in 1947, and
Indonesia followed suit two years later.396 In the late 1950s and early 1960s,
the process was completed when even the least developed territories under
European rule became sovereign states. Among other holdings, Britain lost
British Somaliland and Nigeria in 1960, Jamaica and Uganda in 1962, Kenya
387
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and Zanzibar in 1963, and Bechuanland, Basutoland, and British Guiana in
1966.397 France granted independence to Morocco and Tunisia in 1955 and
1956, respectively.398 Between 1958 and 1960, fourteen sovereign states were
formed out of former French territory in sub-Sahara Africa.399
The materialist arguments regarding the decline of colonization are similar
to those employed to explain the abolition of slavery.400 Supposedly, the
practice ended when it ceased being profitable.401 Indeed, in some cases, force
was instrumental. Algeria, for instance, was only granted independence after a
bitter insurgency against the French.402 But in other cases, there was little to no
resistance to European rule. While the North African Arabs struggled against
the French, sub-Saharan Africans generally parted with their colonial rulers on
amicable terms.403 As the 1950s went on, France became less and less willing
to fight to hold on to its old colonies and by the end of the decade had no
desire to continue ruling over them at all.404
There is no economic or military reason that can wholly explain the rapid
process of decolonization.405 In fact, postwar British and French leaders,
including Charles de Gaulle and Winston Churchill, took the view that the
colonies were more economically valuable than ever since they could
contribute to the recovery effort.406 British colonial and cabinet documents
from the era of decolonization talked of granting states independence not out
of any idea that changes in military or economic interests made doing so
necessary.407 Rather, these deliberations stressed public opinion and the views
of the international community.408
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Not only did Western states give up their own colonies, but they also
condemned other states that tried to hold on to third world territories and
occasionally punished them.409 In fact, aside from classic invasions, the only
kind of aggression that has consistently drawn sanctions in the postwar era has
been wars by Europeans to maintain colonial or apartheid systems and
institutions.410 For example, while the Netherlands was fighting to maintain
control of Indonesia, the colony’s independence was recognized by the U.N.
Security Council.411 States promised aid to Indonesia, and Great Britain
suspended arms and training it had previously agreed to provide to the
Netherlands.412 When France was attempting to put down the rebellion in
Algeria, even its closest allies refused to support the effort, and the General
Assembly recognized Algeria’s right to independence years before the war was
over.413 The pattern repeated itself when African insurgents resisted
Portuguese rule in the 1960s and 70s.414 Communist and African states
supported the Mozambique rebels and were instrumental in helping them
finally achieve independence.415
If material forces were the main factors behind decolonization, European
countries would have given up their overseas territories at different times and
there would be variations regarding which territories gained independence.416
For instance, landlocked territories might have ceased being profitable while
territories bordering oceans did not, or the degree of independence granted
might have been related to the costs imposed on rulers by freedom fighters
resisting foreign domination. It is also possible that all colonies ceased being
profitable but only some states came to realize this fact. Instead, within the
short time period of a few decades, almost every third world territory under
Western control gained independence and joined the state system.417 This
happened regardless of who the colonial ruler was, whether the territory was
resource rich, whether the region had strategic value, or whether the natives
violently resisted foreign occupation.
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Decolonization is best explained by the international community’s embrace
of the concept of self-determination. While the idea is often traced to the
French Revolution, it was not given “quasi-official status” in international law
until the 1919 Paris Peace Conference.418 The norm entrepreneur was the
Wilson administration, which was instrumental in creating the League of
Nations. The fifth of President Wilson’s Fourteen Points called for “[a] free,
open-minded . . . . adjustment of all colonial claims,” under the principle that
the wishes of the people being ruled were to be given equal weight to the
interests of the government in question.419 The Covenant of the League of
Nations made the “advanced nations” responsible for helping the states that
had become independent as a result of the war develop their institutions.420 In
effect, the document declared that some regions were closer than others to
being ready for self-government.
Some states were indeed granted full sovereignty in the interwar period.421
But while those that had been ruled by the Axis Powers gained their
independence, France and Britain in particular held on to their overseas
territories.422 Yet once the right of self-determination was enshrined into
international law, it became difficult to justify why only territories that had
been controlled by countries that lost World War I deserved their freedom. The
period of decolonization followed the same pattern as the abolition of slavery:
those who wanted to end the unpopular practice made primarily moral
arguments, while defenders made a practical case that purported to take
account of the interests of the people subordinated.423
Those who tried to forestall decolonization relied on the same logic that
had motivated Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The U.N.
Charter followed in the footsteps of its predecessor, affirming the principle of
self-determination but also paternalism. Colonial powers were obliged “to
develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the
peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free

418
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political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory
and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement.”424
In the following decades, however, self-determination came to be seen as a
right that people inherently held and one that was divorced from utilitarian
logic and notions of paternalism.425 History, culture, degree of ethnic
fragmentation in the colony, and the level of its institutional or economic
development were irrelevant. Jackson writes that today, “it would be about as
hard for an independent country to become a colony—even if the people voted
to do so—as it would be for citizens of a democracy to sell themselves into
slavery.”426 By the 1960s, few leaders were “prepared to defend
[colonialism’s] legitimacy and lawfulness in public.”427
While President Wilson called for self-determination for “peoples,” the
right to independence was granted to various colonies, many of which were
ethnically and culturally heterogeneous.428 But true ethnic and cultural selfdetermination was and is problematic—there are endless ways to divide
different “peoples.” The lines of the third world drawn by the European powers
were arbitrary, but, putting aside a few isolated cases, it would have been
difficult to divide Africa and Asia into true nation-states in a nonarbitrary
way.429 Therefore, self-determination came to mean the right of individual
countries or former colonies to rule their own affairs if they saw themselves as
distinct enough from the master country, whether a sense of nationhood had
developed in the territory or not.430
Once the existence of states was taken as a given and the United Nations
was established based on the equality of states, the anticolonization norm could
have been expected to be robust. It applied universally and was specific.
Britain has no more right to rule over Uganda than Uganda does to rule over
Britain. The moral case against colonialism could have been challenged on the
basis of utilitarian logic, as it has been argued that some developing countries

424
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were simply not ready for independence.431 Yet, the world was moving away
from these kinds of paternalistic arguments and they have become
unacceptable in discourse over civil and human rights.432 Perhaps a blanket
rule against colonialism was based on the worry that once an exception for less
“developed” areas was granted, the natives would be stigmatized and the
colonial powers would simply look after their own interests while fooling
themselves and others into believing that they were behaving altruistically. But
regardless of the “inherent” moral argument for an absolute ban on
colonization, such a norm is perfectly coherent with the general intellectual
currents of the last century. When this fact is combined with the specificity of
the rule, it is hard to see how a leader could test its parameters and delude
himself into believing he is acting appropriately, or justify his actions before
the international community.
3. The Right to a Decent Standard of Living
In order to see what an effective norm looks like, it is helpful to look at one
that is much less robust: the right to a decent standard of living.433 The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted in 1948 by the General
Assembly, guarantees every individual “a standard of living adequate for the
health and well-being of himself and of his family,” which includes basic
provisions of “food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social
services, and the right to security” in case of disability or advanced age.434
From a legalist perspective, although part of a nonbinding resolution, this
standard of living provision should matter a great deal.435 Less than two

431 See Ali A. Mazrui, Recolonization or Self-Colonization?: Decaying Parts of Africa Need Benign
Colonization, in 2 GOVERNANCE AND LEADERSHIP: DEBATING THE AFRICAN CONDITION 339, 339–41 (Alamin
M. Mazrui & Willy Mutunga eds., 2003) (arguing for a new “benign colonization” of Africa after the mid1990s genocide in Rwanda).
432 See Jackson, supra note 403, at 134.
433 See, e.g., Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and
International Law, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 287, 348 (1996); Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law:
Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 60 (1982).
434 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 385, art. 25.
435 According to one scholar, “[t]he Universal Declaration remains the primary source of global human
rights standards,” and its widespread acceptance “distinguishes it from conventional obligations.” Hannum,
supra note 433, at 290.
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decades later, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights included a very similar provision.436
Despite the hopes of many international lawyers, however, the international
community does not yet force states to provide their citizens disability benefits,
support for the elderly, or any of the other programs of the modern welfare
state. When Americans debated health care reform during President Obama’s
first term, anyone who suggested that international law required Congress to
pass the Affordable Care Act437 would have been ignored, if not widely
derided. In fact, some conservatives were proud that the United States
remained an international outlier in not providing universal healthcare, seeing
it as a positive example of “American exceptionalism.”438
The failure of this international norm can be explained by the model
presented. First of all, there was never a powerful norm entrepreneur that
forced states to adopt a welfare state. The most powerful countries of the last
two centuries, Great Britain and the United States, have had relatively laissezfaire economic policies by world standards.439 They have opposed communism
but have generally neither encouraged other states to adopt generous welfare
policies nor discouraged them. Unsurprisingly, neither the U.N. Charter nor its
predecessor, the Covenant of the League of Nations, mentions anything about
domestic redistributionist policies. In fact, by affirming sovereign rights in the
domestic sphere, these documents arguably precluded international law from
requiring states to guarantee citizens a minimum standard of living. While the
Soviet Union was a powerful actor that stressed the primacy of positive rights,
it was never in the dominant global position that Britain and the United States
were in in the late nineteenth century and after World War II respectively.
Furthermore, communist states, because of their records, lacked the moral

436 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 11, Dec. 19, 1966, S. EXEC. DOC.
95-2, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. (“The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an
adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to
the continuous improvement of living conditions.”)
437 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 20, 21, 25, 26, and 42 U.S.C.).
438 See Paul Roderick Gregory, American Exceptionalism: Obama’s Achilles Heel?, FORBES, (June 10,
2012, 8:58 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/paulroderickgregory/2012/06/10/american-exceptionalismobamas-achilles-heel/.
439 Gary Marks, The Revival of Laissez Faire, in POLITICS IN BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES:
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 28, 31 (Richard Hodder-Williams & James Ceaser, eds. 1988).
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capital to make the causes they championed seem compelling.440 It is little
wonder, then, that across the world communist governments were only able to
come to power through force.
Even if the Soviet Union could be considered a sufficiently strong moral
entrepreneur, the standard of living norm lacks any degree of specificity.
People disagree about what level of health care, disability insurance, and other
benefits are sufficient for an “adequate” standard of living. Over the past
several decades, all segments of the American population have seen an
increase in overall living standards.441 By many measures, such as height and
nutritional intake, the average poor Americans today are better off than middle
class Americans of the 1950s.442 But government agencies continue to find
tens of millions of Americans living in “poverty” by simply changing the
definition of the term as living standards improve.443 This malleable definition
shows how difficult it is to determine an adequate standard of living. A
standard of living norm thus lacks any objective standards a would-be enforcer
can point to, and thus specificity.
The standard of living norm also lacks moral clarity. One survey found that
Americans named the Bible as the book that most influenced their lives, with
Ayn Rand’s Atlas Shrugged in second place.444 Rand’s novel put forth a
utilitarian critique of the welfare state, but her main arguments were moral.445
Individuals were said to have a right to contract with one another and have
their agreements enforced, and the state was to do no more than was absolutely
necessary for a consent-based society to function.446 Some philosophers make

440 See DANIEL C. THOMAS, THE HELSINKI EFFECT: INTERNATIONAL NORMS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE
DEMISE OF COMMUNISM 195 (2001). Conversely, human rights activists in the communist world were
galvanized when Eastern bloc governments agreed to grant their citizens negative rights such as freedom of
speech and religion as a matter of international law. Id. at 196.
441 See Robert Rector & Rachel Scheffield, Air Conditioning, Cable TV, and an Xbox: What is Poverty in
the United States Today?, in BACKGROUNDER 2011, at 1, (Heritage Found. No. 2575, July 18, 2011), available
at http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2011/pdf/bg2575.pdf.
442 See id. at 2.
443 Id. at 2 n.2.
444 Stephen Moore, ‘Atlas Shrugged’: From Fact to Fiction in 52 Years, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 2009.
445 Craig Biddle, Atlas Shrugged and Ayn Rand’s Morality of Egoism (Part 2 of 3), CAPITALISM
MAGAZINE, (Aug. 14, 2010), http://capitalismmagazine.com/2010/08/atlas-shrugged-and-ayn-rands-moralityof-egoism-part-2-of-3/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2013).
446 AYN RAND, ATLAS SHRUGGED (1957) (“The only proper functions of a government are [the police,
army,] . . . and the courts, to protect your property and contracts from breach or fraud by others, to settle
disputes by rational rules, according to objective law.”)
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similar arguments in a more systemized fashion, putting a great deal of
emphasis on the distinction between acts of commission and omission, or the
granting of positive and negative rights.447 Jonathan Haidt has found that
cultures universally value the idea of fairness.448 But, in the American context,
to conservatives it means people getting what they deserve, while liberals are
more concerned with achieving an equitable distribution of resources.449 This
moral divide of modern American politics stems from whether persons are
inclined to view “fairness” as requiring proportionality—i.e. to each what is his
due—or equality.450
This is not to say that there are not good moral arguments for the welfare
state. From a purely utilitarian perspective, the declining marginal utility of
money may justify taking from the rich and giving to the poor.451 But Haidt
finds that educated, modern Westerners are unique in believing that morality is
only about fairness and harm, or that decisions regarding political and social
issues should solely be based on utilitarian calculations.452 Those who believe
that arguments against the welfare state will one day be as unacceptable as
arguments against abolition are likely to be disappointed. As of June 2012, the
vast majority of governments in Africa, Asia, and Latin America did not even
provide their citizens universal healthcare.453 In the first American presidential
debate of 2012, Mitt Romney accused President Obama of engineering a
“government takeover” of the healthcare industry, something that the
incumbent denied.454 Unlike the abolitionist position, which took off relatively
soon after it was presented to democratic publics, many Americans and other
educated people with access to uncensored media have heard the arguments for
the welfare state and rejected them.455 They may be wrong, but, their positions

447
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2012, at A20.
455 See Peter Ferrara, America’s Ever Expanding Welfare Empire, FORBES, (Apr. 22, 2011, 7:27 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterferrara/2011/04/22/americas-ever-expanding-welfare-empire/.
449

HANANIA GALLEYSPROOFS

898

4/14/2014 10:24 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

are not absurd and destined to fail because of some inherent contradiction with
other, more fundamental moral ideas.
Attempts to create a standard of living norm through international law have
failed. States do not pressure other governments to provide their own citizens
with education or healthcare. Despite claims that it has been part of
international law for decades, the standard of living norm has not inspired
protests or demands that foreign countries adopt more generous domestic
welfare policies.
C. The Inherent Appeal of the Status Quo Bias
The status quo bias of international law has two parts: a ban on classic
invasions and forcibly taking territory.456 Here, I show that both parts of the
status quo bias fit into the model presented.
1. The Ban on Classic Invasions
International law did not ban any interstate use of force until the conclusion
of World War I.457 Influenced by the Anglo-American peace movement and
Christian progressivism, Woodrow Wilson announced his support for a league
of states that would keep the peace once the war was over.458 After that, every
major combatant supported some form of collective security arrangement.459
The Americans and British were again on the winning side of World War II,
and were able to design a postwar order in their image.
The moral case against interstate aggression can be stated quite clearly. It is
simply the “Golden Rule” applied to foreign affairs: Do not harm others
because you would not want them to harm you. Before World War I, major
intellectuals wrote about war as a heroic and invigorating experience.460 Yet as
first-hand accounts from World War I became available, and film allowed
people to see graphic images of injured and mutilated soldiers and civilians,
this romantic vision of armed conflict was discredited.461
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However, the U.N. Charter lacks complete specificity. It contains some
exceptions that are subject to interpretation. In particular, much debate centers
around the inherent right of self-defense protected by Article 51.462 The
concept of humanitarian intervention remains controversial because it is the
terrain on which two broad intellectual trends meet. Conceptualizing states as
individuals with rights leads to support for a ban on interstate aggression,463
while the application of utilitarian logic seems to suggest that one state has the
duty to prevent atrocities from being committed in another when it can do so at
a relatively low cost.464 Adding to the ambiguity, the Security Council can act
to stop aggression and arguably has the right to define the term.465 Thus, the
ban on classic invasions lacks the specificity of the ban on colonization, for
example.
At the same time, the exceptions and grey areas are not so large that they
swallow the rule. Certain kinds of interstate aggression are unthinkable.
Leaders cannot invade their neighbors for territorial gain or plunder and still
see themselves as behaving in a way that is appropriate for a political figure.
While a state may deceive itself into believing that it is acting in self-defense
when it is actually engaging in aggression, the need for plausible deniability
creates certain limits to the degree to which humans may behave immorally.466
Importantly, each state knows that its neighbor is not going to invade unless it
can do so in a way that still shows respect for the norm.467
This argument requires that at least some wars be considered illegal by
most or all of the world community. There is nothing problematic about this
assumption. While grey areas that pose difficult moral and legal questions
exist, this does not mean that the larger rule is nonexistent. Just as most
individuals never seriously consider murdering other people, few leaders need
462
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to think about the sanctions resulting from a classic invasion before deciding to
refrain from engaging in interstate aggression. In extreme cases, international
sanctions have been used. While the ban on classic invasions may be fuzzy at
its borders, there is a core to the rule that creates an effective international
norm.
2. The Territorial Integrity Norm
The bans on territorial aggrandizement through force and classic invasions
have been intertwined since the beginning of the twentieth century. Clauses in
both the League of Nations Covenant and U.N. Charter express respect for the
territorial integrity of states.468 The moral case against using force to take a
neighbor’s territory is clear. People generally want to see their state preserved.
From the “perspective of the universe,” no sovereign state has the right to take
territory from another.
The territorial integrity norm is also very specific. Therefore, since 1945,
states that have sought to forcibly change well-established borders have been
sanctioned.469 While the classic invasion ban has grey areas, the territorial
integrity norm does not. The international community understands clearly
whether a state has seized territory that belongs to another state. Nearly four
decades of absolute compliance with the territorial integrity norm casts doubt
on rationalist explanations for this feature of international law. Modern
conditions may very well have made territorial aggrandizement less
economically rational than it has been in the past, but even if this were the
case, absent the territorial integrity norm, self-interested states could be
expected to occasionally midjudge this fact and launch wars to seize territory.
The territorial integrity norm has not been disturbed by the growing
acceptance of humanitarian intervention or strikes against terrorism. For even
if intervening to stop atrocities in a country is justifiable, the intervening state
cannot make a case as to why it should annex the territory of the target. While
the international community may have pushed for the breakup of Yugoslavia,
the involved powers sought the creation of new states rather than allowing
Kosovo to join Albania or the United States.470 The absolute ban on territorial
468
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aggrandizement through force has likely decreased the likelihood of aggression
accompanied by self-serving claims of self-defense or humanitarian
motivations.
D. Towards an Abolition of War?
In reviewing the history of the abolition of slavery, some scholars find
reasons to be optimistic about the potential of abolishing war.471 While some
claim that armed conflict is natural and inevitable, in the past much of the same
had been said about slavery.472 The rules against colonization, slavery, and
aggressive war share a common moral core. They are all based on the general
principle that it is wrong to use force to extract benefits from others.473 In the
model presented here, once some version of the “Golden Rule” or nonexploitation principle is accepted, norms survive and proliferate via the
escalator of reason and the desire of each psychologically normal individual to
maintain a positive reputation and self-image. The importance of ideas in
shaping international law is reflected in the fact that there is a great deal of
similarity between each of the successful norms reviewed and the failure of
economic explanations to fully account for the development of these rules.474
We are a long way from the abolition of war. But, the trends have been
headed in the right direction.475 And while desire for territory has been the
main cause of war throughout history, states no longer use force to take land
from one another.476 Without the possibility of accomplishing the most
historically common major aim of war, the option of initiating armed conflict
has unsurprisingly become less appealing to world leaders, including the rare
individuals that do not internalize international norms and simply behave in a
self-interested manner. The model and empirical evidence combine to provide
a plausible account of how international law can influence state behavior even
in a system traditionally thought to be anarchic and when the most important
state interests are at stake.
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CONCLUSION
From the moment states began interacting with one another, they have
engaged in armed conflict.477 Until the twentieth century, few thought that it
was possible that states would ever stop trying to overthrow the rulers of other
states or seize foreign territory. Without an international leviathan analogous to
a domestic government, it has been argued, states would always interact with
one another in a state of anarchy.478 In fact, it was not until after the First
World War that any form of interstate aggression was prohibited by
international law.479 The period immediately following the founding of the
League of Nations is often emphasized for the lessons in supposedly teached
about not being naïve regarding the prospects of international law leading to
orderly interactions.480
After World War II, however, most states gave up on classic invasions and
in the majority of situations many sanctioned the few states that did not adopt
this new norm.481 Further, no state has taken territory from another by force in
close to four decades.482 There is thus a status quo bias in how the international
community treats the interstate use of force—the more destabilizing a military
action is, the more likely the world community is to sanction the aggressor.483
By any reasonable definition, there is a coherent doctrine of international law
governing the interstate use of force.
While realism is still an important paradigm in international relations, its
influence has waned over the last few decades.484 Approaches that rely on
political psychology are better suited to explain the status quo bias of
international law regarding the use of force.485 If states only cared about
security and power, then one would have to maintain that every state in the
world decided that it no longer had an interest in seizing territory from other
states at about the same time. The abolitionist and decolonization movements
stand as perhaps the two clearest historical precedents showing the importance
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of ideas in shaping international law.486 These norms share the same
underlying logic, which is that no individual or group has the right to use force
to dominate another.487 This reasoning has over time naturally come to be
extended to issues of war and peace.488
None of this is to say that in international relations relative power between
states is unimportant. Perhaps, states ignore international law when making
policy in areas that are not traditionally governed by global norms, or in those
where there is more ambiguity regarding appropriate rules. But once a norm
entrepreneur has created a rule of international law that is specific and morally
compelling, the norm can shape behavior.489 This is especially true when the
idea fits into the larger intellectual climate of the era. Today, classic invasions
are rare, and when they occur the aggressor state tends to be punished.490
National leaders who do not internalize the rules of international law are at
least deterred by the sanctions they would face for beginning wars.
Political psychology explains why it makes sense to believe that leaders
internalize rules of international law and punish aggressors out of a sense of
moral conviction. In laboratory settings, people only behave in ways they
consider immoral to the extent to which they can maintain “plausible
deniability” and see themselves as acting in conformance with social norms.
The rule against classic invasions is somewhat fuzzy, but virtually everyone
agrees certain cases qualify. In any particular instance, it is easy to discern
whether the territorial integrity norm is being followed. Its prohibition on
forcible annexation takes what has historically been the main motivation for
war off the table. When states know they will not forcibly lose territory, they
are less likely to seize land as a defensive measure, which has important
implications for the security dilemma.491
Furthermore, we have also seen that individuals punish norm violators or
cheaters, even when the sanctioning party has nothing to gain by doing so.492
This helps to explain why states sanction governments that violate the norms
maintaining the international status quo. Any actors that still wish to behave as
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more completely self-interested units must take this into account when
deciding whether to go to war. As the forms of prohibited aggression become
less common, violators send an even larger signal indicating that they are
mentally unbalanced or otherwise unfit to be leaders of a modern state.
Some may argue that the status quo bias of international law is not ideal, or
even desirable. John Yoo, for example, writes that it is far from self-evident
“that the desirable level of force, apart from examples of self-defense, in the
international system is in fact zero.”493 According to this train of thought, to
the extent that it is followed, this bias prevents the international community
from dealing with the modern threats of terrorism, intrastate humanitarian
disasters, and rogue states.494 Similarly, Glennon argues that there should be a
legalist regime that allows for humanitarian intervention, even as he concedes
that such wars cannot currently be considered legal under international law.495
Whatever the merits to these arguments, it is only by clearly understanding
what modern norms are good for—whether and how they influence state
behavior—that we can more carefully think about whether they should be
changed. If economic and technological changes made the decline of classic
invasions and territorial aggrandizement through force inevitable, then there
may be little risk in tinkering with the current rules governing the interstate use
of force. On the other hand, if international law is biased towards preserving
the status quo as a result growing humanitarian sentiment and the two world
wars, then changing the rules governing the interstate use of force may risk the
stability of the world order. James Fearon argues that the international
community should reject attempts at secession because weakening the norm in
favor of preserving territorial integrity could embolden other actors to fight for
independence, and thus lead to more armed conflict.496 Similarly, if a principle
of humanitarian intervention came to be more widely accepted, the parameters
of the norm against classic invasions would become fuzzier than they already
are. This could make it easier for states to justify attacking others for selfinterested reasons. Encouraging more armed conflict is especially dangerous in
an era of weapons of mass destruction. It may or may not be worth taking this
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risk to, for example, develop a new norm allowing states to stop governments
that are committing atrocities against their own people.
On the other hand, perhaps a loosening of the norm banning classic
invasions would not lead to more armed conflict, because the territorial
integrity norm would remain clear and put a limit on self-serving and
hypocritical behavior. Either way, a basic review of the history of changes in
international behavior shows how influential moral ideas about right and
wrong can be. Proposed changes must therefore be considered in a holistic
manner, all the while taking into account cognitive biases and potential
adjustments in incentive structures. A complete cost-benefit analysis of
reforming the international system must include the chances and harms of
weakening the norms underlying the status quo bias of international law
regarding the interstate use of force.

